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SURVIVORSHIP  RIGHTS  IN  JOINT  BANK  




Every   day,   elderly   people   who   live   alone   find   themselves  
worried  about   losing  the  mental  or  physical  ability   to  pay  their  
own  bills.     Those  who  seek  legal  advice  would  likely  be  told  to  
use  a  durable  power  of   attorney,  where   specific  powers   can  be  
granted   that  will   either   continue  past   the  principal’s   incapacity  
or  will  not  spring   into  existence  until   incapacity.     Lacking   legal  
knowledge   or   advice   about   durable   powers   of   attorney,   the  
elderly  person  often  decides  to  add  another  authorized  signer  to  
his   or   her   bank   accounts.      Perhaps   the   person   formerly   had   a  
joint   account   with   a   spouse   who   is   now   deceased,   and   the  
surviving   spouse   now   needs   an   additional   signer   to   give   the  
assurance   that   someone   can   take   care   of   his   or   her   affairs.    
Choosing  a  child  or  another  relative,  one  who  lives  nearest,  to  be  
a   co-­‐‑signer   on   a   bank   account   seems   like   a   logical,   simple  
solution   that   allows   someone   to   step   in   quickly   to   help   if  
necessary.      In  most   cases,   this  arrangement  may  be  satisfactory  
during  the  remainder  of  the  elderly  person’s  life.    The  additional  
signer  may  never  be  needed  but,  if  needed,  the  signer  may  carry  
out   the   duties   of   paying   the   elderly   person’s   bills   without  
incident.1     But  doing  so  can  create  untold  discord  later,  because  
 
*   Gregory   Eddington,   Director   of   Legal   Research   and   Writing,   Oklahoma   City  
University,   J.D.  University  of  Oklahoma,  LL.M.   in  Taxation,  New  York  University  
School  of  Law.  I  would  like  to  thank  my  research  assistant,  Youngwoo  Ban.    
   1.     Of   course,   there   are   also   numerous,   tragic   examples   of   the   elderly   being  
taken  advantage  of  while  alive,  but  those  situations  are  not  the  focus  of  this  article,  
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it  can  inadvertently  change  the  distribution  of  the  estate.      
When   an   elderly   person   dies,   the   question   arises:   Do   the  
funds  in  the  account  belong  to  the  decedent’s  estate,   to  pass  by  
will  or  intestacy,  or  do  they  belong  to  the  additional  signer  as  a  
co-­‐‑owner  of  the  account?    In  at  least  hundreds  of  reported  cases,2  
courts  have  been  required  to  determine  a  bank  depositor’s  intent  
at   the   time   the   depositor   opened   a   joint   account   or   added   an  
additional  signer  to  an  already-­‐‑existing  account.    Many  of  these  
cases   may   fit   the   description   above,   but   the   depositor   is   of  
course   deceased   and   thus   unable   to   testify   about   his   or   her  
intentions.    The  heirs  or  beneficiaries  of  the  decedent’s  estate  or  
trust   then   compete  with   the  additional   signer   for  ownership  of  
the   funds   in   the   account,   either   as   part   of   the   probate   of   the  
estate   or   in   a   separate   action   for   conversion.      The   heirs   or  
beneficiaries   contend   that   the   bank   account   belongs   to   them  
because   the   decedent   only   wanted   someone   to   be   available   to  
sign  in  emergencies  and  did  not   intend  the  additional  signer  to  
receive   the   account   at   death.      These   parties   urge   the   court   to  
ignore   the   express   or   implied   survivorship   feature   of   the   bank  
account  and  distribute  the  funds  according  to  the  decedent’s  will  
or   trust,   or   according   to   state   intestacy   statutes.      On   the   other  
hand,   the  additional  signer  claims  ownership  as  surviving   joint  
tenant.     Because  the  funds  automatically  belong  to  the  survivor  
under  the  rules  of  joint  tenancy,  no  funds  from  the  account  exist  
to  pass  to  the  decedent’s  estate.  
In  response  to  the  extensive  litigation  about  this  issue,  state  
 
and  the  same  financial  abuse  could  occur  with  a  durable  power  of  attorney.  
   2.     See,  e.g.,  cases  compiled  at  Annotation,  Deposit  of  Fund  Belonging  to  Depositor  
in  Bank  Account  in  Name  of  Himself  and  Another,  149  A.L.R.  879,  880-­‐‑81  (1944);  JESSE  
DUKEMINIER,  ROBERT  H.  SITKOFF,  &  JAMES  LINDGREN,  WILLS,  TRUSTS,  AND  ESTATES  
432  (8th  ed.  2009)  (“Because  banks  and  brokerage  houses  often  give  their  customers  
a   joint   tenancy   form  without   regard   to   the   customer’s  particular   intention,   courts  
are   often   left  with   the   problem  of   discerning  which   type   of   account  was   actually  
intended.”)   The   author’s   experience   as   a   practicing   attorney   is   that   many   more  
cases   would   be   contested   were   it   not   for   state   court   decisions   that   conclusively  
presume   that   the   funds  belong   to   the   survivor.   Further,  many   accounts   are   small  
compared  to  the  value  of  the  decedent’s  estate,  so  contesting  the  ownership  of  the  
funds  is  not  cost-­‐‑effective.  But  awarding  the  funds  to  the  survivor  can  be  contrary  
to  the  decedent’s  intent,  regardless  of  the  size  of  the  account.  
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legislatures   and   courts   have   created   various   sets   of   rules   to  
decide   these   cases   or,   in   some   jurisdictions,   to   eliminate  
litigation   entirely.      There   are   several   different   procedural   or  
evidentiary   approaches   to   resolving   these   disputes,   most   of  
which   favor   the   additional   signer.3     Most   of   these   frameworks  
provide   a   presumption   that   the   depositor   intended   that   the  
additional   signer   own   the   funds   at   the   depositor’s   death4—in  
other  words,  that  the  funds  pass  outside  the  system  of  testacy  or  
intestacy.      In   some   states,   this   presumption   is   conclusive;   in  
others,  the  beneficiaries  or  heirs  may  rebut  the  presumption.    In  
some  states,  the  presumption  depends  on  the  depositor’s  use  of  
words   like   “survivor”   or   “survivorship,”   and   in   others,   the  
opposite  presumption  may  exist  without  these  words.  
This  Article  contends  that  the  majority  of  these  approaches  
are   misguided   because   they   treat   bank   accounts   like   other  
arrangements   known   as   will   substitutes.      Will   substitutes   are  
arrangements,   such   as   life   insurance,   that   transfer   property   at  
death  but  operate  outside  the  system  of  wills  and  probate.    They  
are   considered   valid   ways   to   transmit   property   at   death   even  
though   they   do   not   comply   with   the   formalities   required   for  
wills.     The  primary  policy   justification   for  allowing   their  use   is  
that  the  required  will  formalities  are  adequately  replaced  by  the  
formalities   required   to   set   up   the   will   substitute,   so   the   will  
substitutes  are  sufficiently  reliable.5     This  Article  will  show  that  
although   this   rationale   supports   finding   other   types   of   will  
substitutes   as   valid   ways   to   pass   property   at   death,   the  
formalities  associated  with  creating  a  joint  bank  account  are  not  
analogous   and   do   not   prove   that   the   depositor   intended   the  
additional   signer   to   receive   the   funds   in   the   account.      These  
approaches  ignore  the  fact  that  a  bank  depositor  may  often  have  
other  non-­‐‑donative  goals  for  creating  the  account  or  adding  the  
signer   and   may   not   have   an   easy   alternative   method   to  
 
   3.     JESSE  DUKEMINIER,  ROBERT  H.  SITKOFF,  &  JAMES  LINDGREN,  WILLS,  TRUSTS,  
AND  ESTATES  434-­‐‑35  (8th  ed.  2009).    
   4.     Id.  
   5.     Id.at  397;  UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑101  cmt.  (amended  2008).  
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accomplish   those   goals.      Part   I   of   this   Article   will   set   out   the  
policies  behind   treating  will   substitutes  as  valid  dispositions  of  
property   at   death   and   explain   why   joint   bank   accounts   are  
dissimilar  from  all  other  will  substitutes.  
Part   II   of   this   Article  will   set   out   the   differing   procedural  
frameworks   used   by   states   and   analyze   why   most   are   not  
consistent   with   the   goal   of   determining   the   decedent’s   intent.    
Historically,   courts   decided   these   disputes   based   on   common-­‐‑
law   rules   regarding   presumptions   and   burdens   of   proof.      The  
recent  trend  is  for  legislatures  to  set  the  rules  through  adoption  
of  some  version  of  the  Uniform  Probate  Code  or  another  statute.  
Part   III   of   this   Article   will   evaluate   the   use   of   statutorily  
prescribed  bank  account   forms.     A   few  state   statutes,  primarily  
those   from   states   that  have   adopted   the  most   recent  version  of  
the   Uniform   Probate   Code,   provide   optional   forms   that   banks  
may   use   to   assess   the   depositor’s   intent.      The   forms   offer  
numerous   options   for   a   depositor   to   indicate   intent   regarding  
ownership  rights  and  rights  at  death,  and  proper  use  of  the  form  
creates  a  conclusive  presumption.    This  Article  will  examine  the  
forms’  complexity  and  propose  changes  that  would  better  serve  
the   purpose   of   allowing   the   depositor   to   express   his   or   her  
intent.  
Finally,  this  Article  will  conclude  with  recommendations  for  
a   new   deposit   account   form,   or   alternatively,   modifications   to  
forms  in  existence  to  allow  a  depositor  without  legal  training  to  
indicate  how  the  funds  in  the  account  should  pass  at  death.    For  
states   that  do  not  have  a   form  and  do  not  choose  to  adopt  one,  
this  Article  proposes  eliminating  presumptions  and  evidentiary  
burdens   that   favor   the   additional   signer   over   the   depositor’s  
heirs  or  beneficiaries.  
I.  WILL  SUBSTITUTES  AND  THEIR  POLICY  JUSTIFICATION  
In   the   parlance   of   the   law   of   wills   and   succession,   joint   or  
multiple-­‐‑party  bank  accounts  are  part  a  group  of  arrangements  
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known   as   “will   substitutes.”6      They   are   considered   substitutes  
for  wills  because   they   legally  pass  property  at  a  person’s  death  
without   compliance   with   the   wills   statutes.      The   law   of   wills  
requires  formalities,  often  including  signing  the  document  at  the  
end  and  in   the  presence  of  witnesses  who  observe  the  signing.7    
Wills   statutes   may   also   require   that   the   witnesses   be  
disinterested,8  and  that  the  will-­‐‑maker  ask  the  witnesses  to  sign  
and   declare   to   the   witnesses   that   he   is   familiar   with   the  
document   and   that   the   document   is   intended   as   his   will.9    
Jurisdictions   that   allow   holographic   wills   replace   the   above  
formalities   with   requirements   that   the   will   be   entirely  
handwritten,  signed,  and  dated.10    Historically,  strict  compliance  
with  these  formalities  was  required,  although  the  modern  trend  
is   to   excuse   harmless   errors.11      The   policies   behind   these  
requirements  are  discussed  below,  but  the  primary  goal  of  both  
the  formalities  and  excusing  for  harmless  error  is  to  ensure  that  
the  will-­‐‑maker’s   true   intent   is  memorialized.12      Then,   upon   the  
will-­‐‑maker’s   death,   the   transfer   of   property   via   the   will   is  
administered  through  the   judicial  probate  system,  as  set  out  by  
the  state  statutes.13  
The   will   substitutes   are   exempted   from   these   formalities  
and   from   the   probate   system.      Will   substitutes   are   generally  
considered   to   include   (1)   revocable   trusts,   (2)   life   insurance  
policies,  (3)  retirement  accounts,  (4)  payable-­‐‑on-­‐‑death  or  transfer  
on   death   arrangements   in   bank   accounts   or   securities   (or   now  
real   property),   and   (5)   joint   tenancies   in   real   or   personal  
property.14    The  Restatement  (Third)  of  Property  lists  “multiple-­‐‑
 
   6.     RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  PROP.:  WILLS  AND  OTHER  DONATIVE  TRANSFERS  §  
7.1  (2003).  
   7.     RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  PROP.:  WILLS  AND  OTHER  DONATIVE  TRANSFERS  §  
3.1  cmt.f  (1999).  
   8.     Id.  cmt.o.  
   9.     Id.  cmt.h.  
   10.     Id.  §  3.2.  
   11.     Id.  §  3.3,  cmt.b.  
   12.     Id.  cmts.a,  b.  
   13.     Id.  §  1.1.  
   14.     See,   e.g.,  RESTATEMENT   (THIRD)   OF   PROP.,   supra   note   6.      The   Restatement  
also  lists  annuities  with  death  benefits  as  a  separate  category.  Because  death  benefit  
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party   accounts”   as   a   separate   type   of   will   substitute   but  
acknowledges  that  “not  all   [such]  accounts  are  established  with  
donative   intent.”15      The   premise   of   this   Article   is   that   because  
intent   is   usually   unclear,   multiple-­‐‑party   bank   accounts   should  
not   be   considered   will   substitutes,   but   rather   should   be  
considered  a  separate  type  of  arrangement.  
Although  these  will  substitutes  are  exempted  from  the  wills  
requirements  and   the  probate  system,   the  proffered  reasons   for  
the   exemption   have   varied.      The   original   justification   for  
exempting   will   substitutes   was   that,   unlike   a   will,   the   will  
substitute  makes  a  present  transfer  of  some  property  right.16    The  
right   is   non-­‐‑possessory,   future,   and   subject   to   revocation   or  
divestment   (except   for   true   joint   tenancies),   but   is   still   a   right  
historically  recognized  by  property  law.17    Professor  Langbein,  in  
his  seminal  article,  The  Nonprobate  Revolution  and  the  Future  of  the  
Law  of  Succession,  correctly  pointed  out  the  fallacy  of  the  present-­‐‑
interest   theory   regarding   all   will   substitutes   except   joint  
tenancies.18    Will-­‐‑substitute  arrangements,  such  as  life  insurance  
designations   and   pay-­‐‑on-­‐‑death   designations,   are   entirely  
revocable   as   long   as   the   designator   is   competent.      Thus,   the  
property  interest  they  create  is  no  better  and  no  more  “present”  
than  the  interest  created  by  a  will,  which  may  also  be  revoked  or  
amended.19  
 
designations   in   annuities   do   not   raise   issues   distinct   from   retirement   account  
designations,   or   possibly   life   insurance   beneficiary   designations,   this   article   does  
not  discuss   them  separately.  The  Restatement  also   lists  Totten   trusts  as  a  separate  
category.   This   article  will   discuss   Totten   trusts   in   the   same   category   of   revocable  
trusts.     In  an  often-­‐‑quoted  article,  John  H.  Langbein,  The  Nonprobate  Revolution  and  
the  Future  of  the  Law  of  Succession,  97  HARV.  L.  REV.  1108,  1111-­‐‑12,  1138  n.122  (1984),  
the   author   used   five   categories,   and   discussed  multiple-­‐‑party   bank   accounts   and  
Totten  trusts  in  the  same  category  as  pay-­‐‑on-­‐‑death  accounts.  
   15.     RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  PROP.,  supra  note  6,  cmt.f.  
   16.     Id.   cmt.a.      For   a   discussion   of   the   development   of   the   gift   theory   as  
justification   for   recognizing   multiple-­‐‑party   bank   accounts   as   valid   methods   to  
transfer   the   funds   at   death.   See   Donald   Kepner,   The   Joint   and   Survivorship   Bank  
Account—A  Concept  Without   a  Name,  41  CALIF.  L.  REV.  596   (1953);  Donald  Kepner,  
Five   More   Years   of   the   Joint   Account   Muddle,   26   U.   CHI.   L.   REV.   376,   378   (1959)  
“[T]here  is  emerging  a  recognition  of  the  joint  account  as  a  unique  form  of  gift….”  
   17.     RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  PROP.,  supra  note  6,  cmt.a.  
   18.     Langbein,  supra  note  14,  at  1128.  
   19.     Id.  at  1127-­‐‑28.  
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Langbein   identified   another   justification   that   he   labeled  
“alternative   formality.”20      Under   this   justification,   the   will  
substitutes   are   effective   to   transfer   property   at   death   because  
they  comply  with  formalities  similar  to  those  required  for  wills,  
and  those  formalities  are  accepted  by  the  practice  of  the  relevant  
business   system—insurance,   banking,   or   otherwise.      Thus,   for  
example,   retirement   plans   require   written   beneficiary  
designations   that   are   signed   by   the   account   owner   and  
witnessed.      These   designations   are   accepted   by   the   plan’s  
administrator  as  proof  of  the  owner’s  intent  and  are  considered  
to   serve   the   same   functions   as   a   will,   so   there   is   no   need   to  
subject  the  designations  to  the  requirements  for  wills.  
The   formalities   required   for   wills   and   the   alternative  
formalities   for   the   will   substitutes   are   considered   to   be   equal  
methods  of  ensuring  that  the  transferor’s  intent  is  implemented,  
which  is  the  ultimate  goal  of  either  system.    Langbein  called  the  
rule  of  respecting  the  transferor’s   intent  the  “only.  .  .theory  that  
can  reconcile  wills  and  will  substitutes  in  a  workable  and  honest  
manner.”21      If   the   formalities   required   by   the   particular   will  
substitute   prove   intent   to   transfer   the  property   at   death,22   then  
the  law  justifiably  respects  the  transaction  and  does  not  require  
compliance   with   the   wills   statutes.      Langbein   concluded   that  
“[t]he   alternative   formalities   of   the   standard   form   instruments  
that  serve  as  mass  will  substitutes  satisfy  this  requirement  [proof  
of   intent   to   transfer]   so   easily   that   the   issue   of   intent   almost  
never  needs  to  be  litigated.”23     However,  the  huge  exception,  as  
 
   20.     Id.  at  1130-­‐‑32;  see  also  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  PROP.,  supra  note  6,  cmt.a,  
reporters’  note,  cmt.a.  
   21.     Langbein,   supra   note   14,   at   1132-­‐‑33.   Respecting   the   transferor’s   intent   is  
also  the  basis  for  the  relaxed  formalities  in  the  modern  Uniform  Probate  Code.  See  
discussion  infra  accompanying  notes  64-­‐‑67.  
   22.     The   term   “testamentary   intent”   is   used   if   a   person   intends   that   the  
document  serve  as  a  will  and  thus  go  through  the  probate  system.    Langbein,  supra  
note   14,   at   1125-­‐‑26   n.69.   A   person   who   uses   a   will   substitute   does   not   exhibit  
testamentary   intent,  because   the  person   intends   to  bypass   the  probate   system.  See  
generally,  James  Lindgren,  The  Fall  of  Formalism,  55  ALB.  L.  REV.  1009,  1017-­‐‑18  (1992)  
(discussing   eight   subcategories   of   testamentary   intent).   This   article   refers   to   the  
intent  of  a  person   intending   to  bypass   the  probate   system  as  “donative   intent”  or  
“intent  to  pass  property  at  death.”  
   23.     Langbein,  supra  note  14,  at  1132.  
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evidenced   by   the   number   of   reported   cases   contesting   the  
transferor’s  intent,  has  been  multiple-­‐‑party  bank  accounts  where  
the   formalities   have   been   inadequate.      The   reason   for   this  
inadequacy   is   that   the   functions   served  by   the  wills   formalities  
are   simply   not   met   by   the   formalities   required   for   joint   bank  
accounts.  
The   formalities   required   for   wills   are   considered   to   serve  
four  functions:24  
(1)  The  “evidentiary  function”  is  to  ensure  that  the  probate  
court   has   “reliable   evidence   of   testamentary   intent   and   of   the  
terms  of   the  will.”25     For  example,   the  requirement  of  a  writing  
proves   the   terms   of   the   testamentary   dispositions;   the  
requirement   of   a   signature   at   the   end   prevents   insertions;   the  
requirement  of  witnesses  assures  genuineness  of  signatures  and  
testimony   regarding   testamentary   intent.26      In   states   that   allow  
holographic   wills,   the   requirement   that   the   testator   write  
everything  by  hand  is  considered  an  adequate  substitute  for  the  
formalities.27  
(2)   The   “channeling   function”   means   that   the  
standardization   of   format   makes   it   easier   to   ensure   that   the  
document  was   intended  as  a  will  and  to   identify   its  dispositive  
terms.28      Thus,   both   the   probate   courts   and   the   testator   can  
confidently   rely   on   the  document   as   testamentary   because   it   is  
typical   of   other  documents   that   are   accepted   as   testamentary.29    
In  other  words,  the  testator’s  compliance  with  formalities  makes  
it  highly  unlikely  that  he  or  she  intended  anything  other  than  a  
testamentary   act.      As   Langbein   noted,   “the   formalities   for  
witnessed   wills   call   for   a   virtually   unmistakable   testamentary  
 
   24.     Ashbel   G.   Gulliver   &   Catherine   J.   Tilson,   Classification   of   Gratuitous  
Transfers,  51  YALE  L.J.  1,  5-­‐‑13  (1941);  John  H.  Langbein,  Substantial  Compliance  With  
the  Wills  Act,  88  HARV.  L.  REV.  489,  492-­‐‑97  (1975).  
   25.     Langbein,  supra  note  24,  at  492  (1975).  
   26.     Id.  at  493.  
   27.     Id.  (quoting  Gulliver,  supra  note  24,  at  13).  
   28.     Langbein,  supra  note  24,  at  493-­‐‑94.  
   29.     RESTATEMENT   (THIRD)   OF   PROP.:  WILLS  &  OTHER  DONATIVE   TRANSFERS   §  
3.3  cmt.a  (1999).  
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act.”30  
(3)   The   “cautionary”   or   “ritual   function”   of   formalities  
means  that  the  testator  is  put  on  notice  that  he  is  performing  an  
important  act  that  will  be  treated  as  determinative  of  his  intent.31    
The  standard  will-­‐‑execution  ceremony,  where   the   testator  signs  
the   written   document   in   the   presence   of   witnesses   who   must  
also  sign  (and  in  some  states  requiring  the  testator’s  statement  to  
the  witnesses  that  the  document  is  his  will),  puts  the  testator  on  
notice  that  the  document  will  be  treated  as  his  certain  expression  
of  how  he  wants  his  property  distributed  at  death.32  
(4)   The   “protective   function”   of   will   formalities   refers   to  
ensuring  that  the  testator  is  not  pressured  or  deceived,  and  that  
the   document   is   actually   the   one   he   intended   to   serve   as   his  
will.33      The   formalities   related   to   this   function   are   the  
requirement   of   disinterested   witnesses   to   protect   against  
coercion  or  fraud,  and  the  requirement  that  the  witnesses  sign  in  
the   presence   of   the   testator   to   protect   against   substitution   of  
another  document.    This  function  has  been  subject  to  criticism  on  
the  grounds  that  the  formalities  are  ineffective  at  protecting  the  
testator   and   sometimes   result   in   wills   being   voided   for  
technicalities.34      Because   of   these   concerns,   the   most   recent  
version   of   the   Uniform   Probate   Code   has   eliminated   the  
requirements   that   witnesses   be   disinterested,   that   they   sign   in  
the  presence  of   the  testator,  and  that   the  testator  announce  that  
the  document  is  his  will.35    This  function  is  also  wholly  absent  in  
holographic  wills  and  in  all  of  the  will  substitutes.36  
 
   30.     Langbein,   supra   note   24,   at   494.   Holographic   wills   obviously   serve   this  
function  less  well  because  of  lack  of  standardization,   id.,  which  explains  their  less-­‐‑
universal   acceptance   and   associated   disputes   about   intent,      see   RESTATEMENT  
(THIRD)  OF  PROP.:  WILLS  &  OTHER  DONATIVE  TRANSFERS  §  3.2  cmts.  a  &  c  (1999).  
   31.     Langbein,  supra  note  24,  at  495.  
   32.     Again,   holographic   wills   are   problematic,   especially   when   testamentary  
intent  is  less  than  clear  from  the  document.    Id.  at  494-­‐‑96.  
   33.     Id.   at   496;   RESTATEMENT   (THIRD)   OF   PROP.:   WILLS   &   OTHER   DONATIVE  
TRANSFERS  §  3.3  cmt.a  (1999).  
   34.     Gulliver,  supra  note  24,  at  9-­‐‑13;  Langbein,  supra  note  24,  at  496.  
   35.     See  UNIF.   PROBATE   CODE   §§   2-­‐‑502   cmt.a,   2-­‐‑505   (amended   2010);   see   also  
Langbein,    supra  note  24,  at  496.  
   36.     Id.  at  497;    RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  PROP.,  supra  note  6,  cmt.a.  
EDDINGTON  MACRO.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   6/13/14    10:13  AM  
184   MARQUETTE  ELDER’S  ADVISOR   [Vol.  15  
Omitting   the   discredited   protective   function,   the   question  
then  becomes  whether  the  remaining  three  functions  are  served  
by  the  formalities  required  by  a  particular  will  substitute.    If  the  
three  functions  are  adequately  served,  then  by  analogy,  the  will  
substitute   should   be   respected   as   a   valid   way   to   transmit  
property  at  death.     To  understand  why   joint  bank  accounts  are  
not   analogous,   we   must   first   examine   why   the   formalities   of  
other  will  substitutes  serve  the  functions  of  the  will  formalities.    
REVOCABLE  TRUSTS  
A  trust   is  a  fiduciary  arrangement  where  one  person  holds  
the   legal   title   to  property   and  has   an   equitable  duty   to  use   the  
property   for   the   benefit   of   another.37      In   the   typical   revocable  
trust  used  as  a  will  substitute,  the  owner  (the  “settlor”)  transfers  
title   to  property   to  a   trustee   (which  often   is   the  same  person  as  
the  owner)  for  the  benefit  of  the  settlor  during  life,  retaining  the  
power   to   revoke.     The  settlor  names  a   successor   trustee   to   take  
over   the  duties  at   the  settlor’s  death  or   incapacity  and  hold  the  
property   for   the   benefit   of   other   beneficiaries   or   distribute   the  
property  to  them  outright  at  the  settlor’s  death.38    Thus,  the  trust  
escapes  the  probate  system  because  the  legal  title  is  in  the  name  
of   a   trustee   and   successor   trustees,   and   the   legal   title   is   not  
affected  by   the  original   owner’s  death.39     Although  a   revocable  
trust   for   personal   property   may   be   oral   in   most   states,40  
intentional   use   of   an   oral   trust   would   be   foolhardy   and   invite  
litigation.      Furthermore,   some   states   require   formalities   similar  
to   those   for  wills.41     A  writing   is   always   required   for   a   trust  of  
real  property.42     Regardless  of  minimum  requirements,  all  well-­‐‑
 
   37.     RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  §  2  (2003).  
   38.     MYRON  KOVE,  GEORGE  GLEASON  BOGERT,  &  GEORGE  TAYLOR  BOGERT,  THE  
LAW  OF  TRUSTS  AND  TRUSTEES  §  264.5,  at  25  (3d  ed.  rev.  2012).  
   39.     Id.  at  26.  
   40.     See,   e.g.,   UNIF.   TRUST   CODE   §   407   (2000),   requiring   clear   and   convincing  
evidence  to  prove  its  creation  and  terms.  
   41.     FLA.   STAT.   ANN.   §   737.111   (West   2012);   N.Y.   ESTATE   POWERS   &   TRUSTS  
LAW  §  7-­‐‑1.18  (2007).  
   42.     RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  §  22  cmt.a  (2003).  
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drafted   trusts   are   written,   signed,   and   include   notarial  
acknowledgements.  
These   formalities   meet   the   evidentiary   function   by  
providing   a   written   document   setting   out   dispositions   of  
property   upon   the   settlor’s   death   and   an   authenticated  
signature.    Furthermore,  it  would  be  the  rare  settlor  who  creates  
a   revocable   trust   without   using   somewhat   standardized  
documents,   either   with   the   assistance   of   a   lawyer   or   using  
documents  from  another  source.     Thus,  the  channeling  function  
is   also   met,   and   intent   to   transmit   property   at   death   is   clear  
because   avoiding   probate   historically   has   been   the   primary  
reason  for  creating   the  revocable   trust.43     Even  though  the   trust  
also  has  provisions  for  the  settlor’s  and  trustees’  incapacities,  the  
provisions  for  dealing  with  the  property  at  the  settlor’s  death  are  
identical  to  those  of  a  will,44  so  the  settlor  demonstrates  donative  
intent   in  the  same  manner  as  a  testator.     Finally,   the  cautionary  
function   is   met   by   the   complexity   of   creating   the   trust  
instrument,   if   nothing   else.      There   are   no   known   cases   of   a  
person   lightly  entering   into  a   revocable   trust  with  questionable  
donative  intent.    In  fact,  some  commentators  consider  revocable  
trusts  superior  to  wills  for  the  purpose  of  eliminating  contests.45    
The   fact   that   the  settlor  used   the   trust  during   life  and  operated  
under  its  terms  shows  that  it  was  not  entered  into  lightly.  
A  “Totten  trust”  or  “tentative  trust”  is  a  less  formal  type  of  
revocable   trust.      A   Totten   trust   is   created   when   a   depositor  
opens  an  account  with  a  financial  institution  in  the  name  of  the  
depositor   “as   trustee”   or   “in   trust”   for   another.46      Both   the  
Restatement  (Third)  of  Trusts47  and  the  Uniform  Probate  Code48  
 
   43.     See,  e.g.,  Langbein,  supra  note  14,  at  1115-­‐‑16;  KOVE  et  al.,  supra  note  38,  at  23.  
   44.     KOVE  et  al.,  supra  note  38,  at  25.  
   45.     E.g.,   WAYNE   M.   GAZUR   AND   ROBERT   M.   PHILLIPS,   ESTATE   PLANNING  
PRINCIPLES  AND  PROBLEMS,  400-­‐‑01  (3rd  ed.  2012);  DUKEMINIER,  supra  note  3,  at  442.    
   46.     RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  §  26  (2003).  The  Totten  trust  is  revocable  
because  the  depositor  may  withdraw  the  funds  at  any  time.  Whatever  funds  remain  
at  the  depositor’s  death  belong  to  the  beneficiary  named  in  the  agreement.  
   47.     Id.  
   48.     UNIF.   PROBATE   CODE   §   6-­‐‑201   (8),   cmt.   (treating   Totten   trusts   as   POD  
designations   and   thus   payable   to   the   beneficiary   at   the   depositor’s   death   under  
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treat  the  beneficiary  as  the  owner  of  the  funds  at  the  depositor’s  
death.49      Although   the   comment   to   the   Restatement   includes  
discussion   of   cases   where   the   depositor’s   intent   in   creating   a  
Totten  trust  has  been  litigated,  for  the  most  part  donative  intent  
is  apparent.    Use  of  the  word  “trust”  or  “trustee”  is  evidence  that  
the   depositor   intends   to   benefit   another.      The   signature   is  
authenticated   by   a   bank   employee,   and   the   standardization   of  
language   can   be   seen   to   channel   the   depositor’s   intent.      The  
cautionary  function  is  somewhat  weaker  because  only  the  use  of  
the   term   “trust”   indicates   the   seriousness   of   the   transaction.    
However,   this   at   least   gives   the   depositor   indication   that   he   is  
creating   something   other   than   the   usual   individual   bank  
account.50  
LIFE  INSURANCE  POLICIES  
The   beneficiary   designations   for   life   insurance   policies  
typically  require  only  notarization  or  witnesses,  or  both.51    But  in  
fact,   the   evidentiary   function   is   easily   met   by   such   limited  
formalities.      The   evidentiary   function   is   met   by   evidence   of  
intent   and   of   the   terms   of   the   disposition.      In   a   life   insurance  
beneficiary  designation,   the   signature   is  proven,   and  no   reason  
exists  for  the  designation  except  to  provide  for  disposition  of  the  
proceeds  at  death.    Thus,  no  other  evidence  is  needed.    The  other  
two   functions   are   just   as   easily   met.      The   standardized   form  
ensures  that  the  policyholder’s  wishes  are  stated,  and  the  nature  
of  the  document  leaves  no  doubt  that  the  policyholder  intended  
the  beneficiary  to  take  the  proceeds  at  death,  thus  channeling  his  
 
section  6-­‐‑212  (b)).  
   49.     The   comment   to   the   Restatement   notes   that   “[e]vidence   may   also   be  
admitted   to   show   that   the   depositor   did   not   intend   to   create   a   trust   at   all.”  
RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  §  26  cmt.a.  
   50.     One   obvious   and   problematic   alternative   to   donative   intent   would   be  
intent   to   avoid   Federal   Deposit   Insurance   Corporation   limits   on   the   amount  
insured.  As  discussed  at  notes  65  infra  and  the  accompanying  text,  the  FDIC  allows  
and   encourages   use   of   joint   accounts   and   Totten   trusts   as   ways   to   increase   the  
amount  insured.    
   51.     RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  PROP.,  supra  note  6;  UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑101  
(2004).  
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wishes.     The  cautionary   function   is  also  met,  again  by   the  very  
nature  of  a  life  insurance  beneficiary  designation.    
RETIREMENT  ACCOUNTS  
The   beneficiary   designations   in   retirement   accounts   are  
treated   as   will   substitutes.      Although   this   treatment   has   been  
subject   to   recent   criticism,52   including   the   argument   that   the  
account  holders  may  not  treat  the  designation  with  care  because  
they   are   not   concerned   about   transferring   property   at   death  
when   they   are   filling   out   retirement   forms   (perhaps   when  
starting  a  new  job),53  the  beneficiary  designations  themselves  are  
undoubtedly   made   for   the   sole   purpose   of   transmitting   the  
assets   at   death.      So   if   the   formalities   associated   with   the  
beneficiary   designations   serve   the   same   functions   as   the   will  
formalities,   then   treating   the   designations   as  will   substitutes   is  
supported  by  policy.     The   evidentiary   function   and   channeling  
function   are   met   in   much   the   same   way   as   life   insurance  
beneficiary  designations  discussed  above.    In  fact,  the  forms  are  
generally  somewhat  similar.    The  cautionary  function  is  slightly  
more   problematic,   as   noted   above.      But,   even   if   the   account  
holder  may  not   be   focused   on  death   at   the   time   of   completing  
the  form,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  purpose  of  the  designation  is  
to   “effectuate   a   transfer”   at   death.      Thus,   regardless   of   the  
account  holder’s  lack  of  focus  or  concern  about  death  at  the  time  
of   completing   the   designation,   he   or   she   cannot   fault   the  
formalities  for  failing  to  inform  of  the  consequences  of  the  act.  
PAY  ON  DEATH  AND  TRANSFER  ON  DEATH  ACCOUNTS  
These   accounts,   along   with   life   insurance   policies,   are   the  
easiest  to  justify  as  will  substitutes.    They  are  created  by  a  signed  
writing,   and   the   signature   is   either   notarized   or   verified   by   a  
representative   of   the   institution.      The   standardization   of   the  
 
   52.     Stewart   E.   Sterk   &   Melanie   B.   Leslie,   Accidental   Inheritance:   Retirement  
Accounts  and  the  Hidden  Law  of  Succession,  89  N.Y.U.  L.  REV.  2  (forthcoming  2014).  
   53.     Id.  at  2-­‐‑3,  35.  
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forms   is   statutory,54   and   the  words   themselves   reference  death,  
so  they  leave  no  doubt  that  the  account  holder  is  indicating  who  
is   to   receive   the   property   at   death.      Thus   the   evidentiary   and  
channeling   functions  are  met.     The   cautionary   function  may  be  
met  by  the  title  of  the  document  alone;  there  could  be  no  doubt  
that  the  account  holder  is  seriously  contemplating  distribution  of  
the  property  at  his  or  her  death.  
JOINT  TENANCIES  WITH  SURVIVORSHIP  IN  REAL  PROPERTY  OR  
PERSONAL  PROPERTY  
Joint  tenancies  in  tangible  property  can  be  justified  either  by  
the  policy  of  analogy  to  wills   formalities  or  by  the  old  “present  
interest”   theory.      First,   the   formalities   associated  with   creating  
these   joint   tenancies   are   comparable   to   those   of   wills   and   the  
other  will  substitutes.    Notarization  evidences  the  signature,  and  
the   co-­‐‑tenants   are   listed   in   writing.      Further,   the   law   itself  
provides   evidence   of   the   terms—equal   ownership   on   creation  
and   sole   ownership   on   the   death   of   the   co-­‐‑tenant.55      The  
standardization   of   forms   clearly   channels   the   donor’s   intent.    
Real  estate  deeds  are  statutory,  and  all  parties  can  be  confident  
in  their  acceptance  for  transmitting  the  property  to  the  survivor.    
Similarly,   auto   titles   (or   similar   titles   for   other   personal  
property)   are   standardized,   and  provided  and  administered  by  
state   agencies   guaranteeing   their   acceptance   and   ensuring   that  
the   channeling   function   is   met.      Regarding   the   cautionary  
function,   although   there   are   instances   of   donors   attempting   to  
revoke  joint  tenancies  by  contending  that  they  created  them  out  
of  motives  other  than  intent  to  transmit  property,56   the  rarity  of  
these  instances  indicates  that  donors  understand  the  seriousness  
of  creating  joint  tenancies.    There  are  also  numerous  cases  where  
a  person  has  created  a  joint  tenancy,  intending  to  use  it  as  a  will  
substitute,  but  then  changed  his  mind  and  attempted  to  unwind  
 
   54.     See,  e.g.,  UNIF.  TOD  SECURITY  REGISTRATION  ACT  (1989).  
   55.     RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  PROP.,  supra  note  6,  cmt.a  
   56.     E.g.,  Heible  v.  Heible,  316  A.2d  777,  779  (Conn.  1972).  
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the   transaction.57      However,   this   is   not   an   argument   against  
respecting   the   transaction   as   a   will   substitute   but   is   only   an  
argument  in  favor  of  allowing  revocation.    Furthermore,  the  fact  
that  the  deed  is  filed  at  the  courthouse  (or  the  title  is  filed  with  a  
state   agency)   puts   donors   on   notice   that   they   are   executing   a  
formal,  serious  document.  
Additionally,   joint   tenancies   are   the   one   will   substitute  
where   the   “present   interest”   theory   can   be   applied.      This  
rationale   is   that   the   transaction  does  not  have   to  meet   the  wills  
formalities,  because  it  creates  an  immediate   interest,  not   just  an  
interest  at  death.    Under  black-­‐‑letter  law,  a  joint  tenancy  creates  
a  present  estate  in  which  both  tenants  are  considered  to  own  the  
whole.58      Therefore,   nothing   passes   at   death,   because   the  
survivor’s   interest   is   a   continuation   of   the   interest   already  
owned  when  the  joint  tenancy  was  created.  
APPLICATION  OF  ALTERNATIVE  FORMALITY  POLICY  TO  JOINT  
BANK  ACCOUNTS  
The   overriding   difficulty   with   applying   the   alternative  
formality   policy   to   joint   bank   accounts   is   that   the   general  
purpose   of   all   three   functions—evidentiary,   channeling,   and  
cautionary—is   to   ascertain   and   effectuate   the   decedent’s   intent  
regarding   who   is   to   receive   the   property   at   death.      As   noted  
above   in   the   discussion   of   each   type   of   will   substitute,   even  
though  the  creator  of  the  substitute  may  change  his  mind  later  or  
may  not  be  sufficiently  focused  on  his  time  of  death  when  filling  
out  a  designation,   the  existence  of   intent  to  transfer  property  at  
death   is   clear   in   each   type   of   transaction.      The   formalities  
required   for   each   will   substitute   ensure   that   the   transferor’s  
intent   is   memorialized.      In   contrast,   a   person   creating   a   joint  
bank   account   may   be   doing   so   for   at   least   two   non-­‐‑donative  
reasons.    First,  and  most  commonly  litigated,  the  account  holder  
 
   57.     E.g.,   Blanchette   v.   Blanchette,   287   N.E.2d   459,   461   (Mass.   1972),   noted   in  
Langbein,  supra  note  14,  at  1114.  
   58.     See,  e.g.,  JOHN  E.  CRIBBET  &  CORWIN  W.  JOHNSON,  PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  LAW  
OF  PROPERTY  106  (3d  ed.  1989).  
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may  be  creating  a  joint  account  or  adding  an  additional  signer  to  
an   existing   account   as   a   substitute   for   a   durable   power   of  
attorney.    A  durable  power  of  attorney  is  one  where  the  powers  
of  the  agent  or  attorney-­‐‑in-­‐‑fact  survive  the  principal’s  incapacity  
or   do   not   spring   into   existence   until   the   principal   is  
incapacitated.59    This  is  a  common  estate  planning  document  that  
is   often   routinely   executed   at   the   same   time   as   a   will   or  
revocable   trust.     Despite   the  prevalence  of  durable  powers  and  
the   existence  of  uniform   forms,60   a  person  without   legal   advice  
could  easily  be  unaware  of  the  ability  to  execute  this  document,  
or  be  reluctant  to  do  so,  because  of  lack  of  understanding  or  fear  
of   the   document’s   apparent   complexity.      So,   an   elderly   person  
wanting  to  give  a  relative  the  ability  to  write  checks  in  order  to  
pay   bills   in   the   event   of   incapacity   may   turn   to   a   joint   bank  
account  instead.    Accounts  of  this  type  are  commonly  referred  to  
as  convenience  accounts.61  
Another  non-­‐‑donative   reason   to  open  a   joint  bank  account  
may   be   to   avoid   the   Federal   Deposit   Insurance   Corporation  
(FDIC)   limits   on  account   size.     The  FDIC   insures  deposits   only  
up   to   $250,000   in   a   single   account.62      However,   a   person   may  
open   a   joint   account   with   a   co-­‐‑owner   and   receive   another  
$250,000   of   coverage.63      The   FDIC   even   advises   about   how   to  
structure   accounts   for   maximum   coverage   without   any  
corresponding  advice  about  potential  ramifications.64  
Keeping  these  possible  intentions  in  mind,  when  attempting  
to   apply   the  wills   formalities   functions   to   joint   bank   accounts,  
the   analogy   is   far   from   apt.      The   evidentiary   function   is   to  
provide   evidence   of   testamentary   intent   (or   intent   to   transmit  
 
   59.     E.g.,  UNIF.  DURABLE  POWER  OF  ATTORNEY  ACT  §  1  (amended  1984).  
   60.     E.g.,  UNIF.  POWER  OF  ATTORNEY  ACT  §  301  (2006).  
   61.     The   Uniform   Probate   Code   uses   the   term   “agency”   instead.   See   UNIF.  
PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑204(a)  (2004).  
   62.     12  U.S.C.  §  1821(a)(1)(E)  (2012).  
   63.     12  C.F.R.  §  330.9  (2013).  
   64.     See  Your  Insured  Deposit,  FDIC  (AUG.  23,  2011),  
https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/insured/ownership3.html.   Totten   trust  
accounts  may  also  be  used  to  increase  FDIC  coverage,  creating  a  similar  argument  
about  the  depositor/trustee’s  intent.  
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property   at   death,   in   the   case   of   a   will   substitute)   and   of   the  
dispositive   terms.      As   stated,   the   document   creating   a   joint  
account   could   be   supported   by   various   intentions.      Unless   the  
document   creating   the   account   allows   for   those   alternative  
intentions   to   be   expressed,   so   that   it   clearly   shows   that   the  
decedent   chose   a   joint   account   to   benefit   the   additional   signer  
rather  than  for  mere  convenience,  the  document  could  hardly  be  
said   to   be   reliable   evidence   of   intent   to   transmit   property   at  
death.      The   fact   that   the   signature   on   the  deposit   agreement   is  
verified   by   a   bank   employee   is   reliable   evidence   of   the  
signature’s  authenticity  only,  not  of  the  signer’s  intent.  
Furthermore,   the   process   of   opening   a   multi-­‐‑party   bank  
account   fails   to   satisfy   the   channeling   function.      Deposit  
agreements  may  or  may  not  be  standardized  from  state  to  state  
or  from  bank  to  bank.     Whether  certain  options  are  available   in  
the  deposit  agreement  is  also  not  consistent.65     For  example,  the  
only   joint   deposit   form  offered   to   a   depositor  may  provide   for  
“survivorship,”   so   that   a   depositor   wanting   to   create   a   joint  
account   has   no   easy  means   to   create   a   convenience   or   agency  
account.      Further,   even   if   a   deposit   agreement   is   standardized  
within   a   particular   bank   or   a   particular   jurisdiction,   the  
depositor  may  not   understand   the   document,   so   his   intent   can  
hardly   be   said   to   be   channeled.66      Recall   that   the   channeling  
function   is   met   by   wills   because   the   formalities   “call   for   a  
virtually  unmistakable  testamentary  act.”67    As  discussed  in  Part  
III,  most  account   forms  are  not  user-­‐‑friendly,  so   the  depositor’s  
intent  is  anything  but  unmistakable.  
Finally,   depositors   creating   joint   accounts   are   not  
adequately  cautioned  about  the  donative-­‐‑transfer  aspect  of  what  
they   are   doing.      Again,   the   cautionary   function   of   will  
formalities   is   to   impress  upon   the   testator   that   this   is   a   serious  
transaction  that  will  determine  who  receives  the  property  at  the  
testator’s  death.    Any  analogous  caution  is  almost  totally  lacking  
 
   65.     See  discussion  infra  Part  III.  
   66.     See  id.  
   67.     Langbein,  supra  note  24,  at  494.  
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when   the   typical   joint   bank   account   is   created.      Even   the  
Uniform  Probate  Code   form,  which   includes  numerous  options  
designed  to  offer  the  depositor  a  way  to  express  his  intent,  does  
not  contain  any  warnings  or  cautions;68   it  merely  offers  various  
alternatives.    Some  type  of  conspicuous  notice  similar  to  those  in  
uniform   durable   power   of   attorney   forms69   would   be   more  
appropriate,   given   that   the   depositor   may   not   have   donative  
intent   in  mind   yet  may   be   held   to   have   done   something   he   or  
she   did   not   intend   at   all.      Even   less   cautionary   are   forms   that  
merely   use   the   word   “survivorship”   amongst   other   terms   of  
legalese   that   are   mostly   designed   to   protect   the   bank.    
Explanation   of   these   terms,   if   any,   is   left   to   bank   employees  
rather   than   legal   counsel.      Furthermore,   and   somewhat  
incredibly,  even  the  words  “survivorship”  or  “survivor”  are  not  
required   in   most   jurisdictions.      Merely   adding   an   authorized  
signer  presumptively  indicates  intent  to  transfer  the  property  to  
that  person  at   the  depositor’s  death.     This  rule   indicates  almost  
total  disregard   for   the  cautionary   function  of   formalities.70     The  
existence   of   alternate   possibilities   for   the   depositor’s   intent  
makes  cautionary  formalities  critical.  
So,   the   three   functions   of   wills   formalities   are   not  
adequately   met   by   the   formalities   required   for   opening   a  
multiple-­‐‑party  bank  account.    Can  it  be  argued  that  treating  such  
accounts  as  will  substitutes,  despite  this  weakness,   is  consistent  
with   the   trend   towards   relaxing   the   formalities   required   for  
wills?    The  answer  is  clearly  “no”  when  one  considers  the  reason  
for  this  trend.    The  most  recent  versions  of  the  Uniform  Probate  
Code   and   the   Restatement   provide   a   harmless   error   rule   that  
allow  a  document  to  be  treated  as  a  will  if  clear  and  convincing  
 
   68.     See  UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑204  (2004).  
   69.     UNIF.   STATUTORY   FORM   POWER   OF   ATTORNEY  ACT   §   1   (1988)   (where   the  
principal   is  warned   in  all   capital   letters   that  “THE  POWERS  GRANTED  BY  THIS  
DOCUMENT  ARE  BROAD  AND  SWEEPING…IF  YOU  HAVE  ANY  QUESTIONS  
ABOUT   THESE   POWERS,   OBTAIN   COMPETENT   LEGAL   ADVICE”);   UNIF.  
POWER   OF   ATTORNEY   ACT   §   301   (2006),   warning   in   bold   letters:   “If   you   have  
questions   about   the   power   of   attorney   or   the   authority   you   are   granting   to   your  
agent,  you  should  seek  legal  advice  before  signing  this  form.”    
   70.     See  discussion  infra  parts  II.A,  II.C.  
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evidence   shows   the   decedent’s   intent   that   it   be   a   will,   despite  
failure   to   comply  with   execution   requirements.71      This   rule  has  
developed   in   response   to   cases   where   courts   held   that   a  
technical   defect,   such   as   signing   on   an   attached   self-­‐‑proving  
affidavit   instead   of   on   the   will   itself,   voided   the   will.72      This  
harmless-­‐‑error  rule  is  consistent  with  the  purpose  of  formalities,  
which   ensures   that   the   decedent’s   intent   is   ascertained   and  
respected.73      If   the   decedent’s   testamentary   intent   was   clear,  
insisting  on  exact  compliance  with  the  formalities  contradicts  the  
purpose   of   the   formalities.74      But   the   same   cannot   be   said   for  
joint  bank  accounts.    The  decedent’s  intent  usually  was  not  clear,  
so  any  analogy  to  the  lessening  of  wills  formalities  is  inapposite.  
The   existence   of   possible   alternate   intentions   also  
undermines   the   present   transfer   theory   as   support   for   treating  
joint   bank   accounts   as   will   substitutes.75      Creation   of   joint  
interests  in  tangible  property,  or  even  intangible  titled  property  
such  as  stock,  creates  present  rights   to   the  property  and  cannot  
be   simply   undone.      But   a   person   who   creates   a   joint   bank  
account  only  for  convenience  does  not  create  any  property  rights  
at   all.     An   agency   is   a   fiduciary   relationship,   not   an   interest   in  
property.76      Thus,   treatment   of   joint   bank   accounts   as   will  
substitutes  is  dubious  under  either  policy  rationale.  
II.  FIVE  APPROACHES  TO  RESOLVING  CLAIMS  TO  A  DECEDENT’S  
BANK  ACCOUNT  
As   one   court   noted   in   1994,   “[s]lowly   and   unevenly,  .  .  .courts  
have  moved  toward  the  inevitable  realization  that  the   joint  and  
 
   71.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  2-­‐‑503  (2004).  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  PROP.,  supra  
note  6.  
   72.     E.g.,  Boren  v.  Boren,  402  S.W.2d  728,  729-­‐‑30  (Tex.  1966).  
   73.     See  generally,   James  Lindgren,  The  Fall  of  Formalism,  55  ALB.  L.  REV.  1009,  
1032  (1992)  (arguing  for  reduced  formalities  to  better  “effectuate  testators’  intents”).  
   74.     In  re  Will  of  Ranney,  589  A.2d  1339,  1344  (N.J.  1991)  (citing  Langbein,  supra  
note  24,  at  489).  
   75.     Although  the  present-­‐‑transfer  theory  has  fallen  into  disfavor,  some  courts  
still   rely   on   it   to   justify   awarding   funds   to   the   surviving   party   instead   of   the  
decedent’s  estate.    In  re  Estate  of  Metz,  256  P.3d  45,  49  (Okla.  2011).  
   76.     RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  AGENCY  §  1.01  (2006).  
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survivorship  bank  account  has  its  own  identity  unconforming  to  
any   hitherto   recognized   common-­‐‑law   methods   of   transferring  
property.”77      When   the   ownership   of   the   account   is   disputed  
after   the  depositor’s  death,   the  process  of   resolving   the  dispute  
varies   from   state   to   state.      These   varying   approaches   are  
themselves   evidence   that   generalizations   about   transferors’  
intentions  are  difficult  at  best.  
Yet   perhaps   because   of   the   “public   dissatisfaction   with  
probate”  that  Professor  Langbein  noted  almost  thirty  years  ago,78  
the   legislative   and   judicial   trend,   albeit   uneven,   has   developed  
toward  treating  joint  accounts  like  other  will  substitutes,  finding  
that   the   funds   pass   to   the   additional   signer,   outside   the  
decedent’s  will   or   intestate   succession   statutes.      In  most   states,  
either  a  statute  conclusively  determines  ownership  based  on  the  
language  used  in  the  account  agreement,  or  the  statute  sets  out  a  
presumption  of  ownership  or  a  burden  of  proof,  or  both.79    Most  
states   favor   the   surviving   co-­‐‑tenant   to   some   degree.      The  
majority   of   states   have   adopted   some   version   of   the   Uniform  
Probate   Code   or   one   of   the   uniform   acts   that   are   incorporated  
therein.     Others   have   common-­‐‑law  presumptions  with   varying  
burdens  of  proof.     The  various  approaches  can  be  grouped  into  
five  general   categories,  which  are  presented  below   in   the  order  
of   their   frequency  of  use.     For  each  category,  an  analysis  of   the  
policy  basis  or   lack   thereof   is  presented.     As  will  be  seen,  most  
approaches   fail   to   satisfy   the  primary  policy   goal   of   respecting  
the  transferor’s  intent.  
A.    PRESUMPTION  OF  SURVIVORSHIP  CAN  BE  OVERCOME  ONLY  BY  
CLEAR  AND  CONVINCING  EVIDENCE.  
The  most   common   rule   is   that   funds   remaining   in   a   “joint  
account”   belong   to   the   survivor,   absent   clear   and   convincing  
evidence  of   the  deceased  depositor’s   contrary   intent.     The   term  
 
   77.     Wright  v.  Bloom,  635  N.E.2d  31,  37  (Ohio  1994).  
   78.     Langbein,  supra  note  14,  at  1116.  
   79.     Infra  n.83.  
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“joint  account”   includes  “an  account  payable  on  request   to  one  
or   more   of   two   or   more   parties,   whether   or   not   a   right   of  
survivorship   is  mentioned.”80      Several   states   have   adopted   this  
standard   via   common   law   or   statute.   81      This   rule   has   the  
advantage   of   some   flexibility,   avoiding   the   harshness   of   a  
conclusive  presumption.     But   the   rule   is   still  more   favorable   to  
the  co-­‐‑tenant  than  any  other  approach  because  the  presumption  
exists   regardless   of   whether   the   term   “survivor”   or  
“survivorship”  appears  in  the  account  agreement.82  
 
   80.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑101  (2004).  
   81.     States   currently   using   the   original   Uniform   Probate   Code   for   multiple-­‐‑
party  bank  accounts  or  a  statutes  based  on  the  same  language  are  California,  CAL.  
PROB.  CODE   §   5302   (West   2009);  Maine,  ME.  REV.   STAT.  ANN.;   South  Dakota,   S.D.  
CODIFIED   LAWS   §   29A-­‐‑6-­‐‑104;   South   Carolina,      S.C.   CODE   ANN.   §   62-­‐‑6-­‐‑104   (2009);  
HAW.  REV.  STAT.  ANN.  §  560:6-­‐‑104  (LexisNexis  2010);  Minnesota,  MINN.  STAT.  ANN.  
§  524.6-­‐‑204  (West  2012);  New  Jersey,  N.J.  STAT.  ANN.  §  17:16I-­‐‑5  (West  2001);  Utah,  
UTAH  CODE  ANN.  §  75-­‐‑6-­‐‑104  (LexisNexis  1993);  Virginia,  VA.  CODE  ANN.  §  6.2-­‐‑608  
(2010).     States   that  have  not  adopted   the  Uniform  Probate  Code  but  use   the   same  
rules  are  the  following:  Illinois,  765  ILL.  COMP.  STAT.  1005/2  (West  2009)  (abolishing  
survivorship   rights   but   excepting   multiple-­‐‑party   bank   accounts.   Prior   case   law  
provided  a  rebuttable  presumption  for  the  survivor,  Murgic  v.  Granite  City  Trust  &  
Sav.  Bank,  202  N.E.2d  470,  472  (Ill.  1964));  Florida,  FLA.  STAT.  ANN.  §  655.79  (West  
2013);  Connecticuit,  CONN.  GEN.   STAT.  ANN.   §   36A-­‐‑290   (West   2011);  Georgia,  GA.  
CODE  ANN.  §  7-­‐‑1-­‐‑813  (2004);  Indiana,  IND.  CODE  §  32-­‐‑17-­‐‑11-­‐‑18  (2002);  Kentucky,  KY.  
REV.   STAT.   ANN.   §   391.315   (2010);   Oregon,   OR.   REV.   STAT.   §   708A.470   (2011)  
(rebuttable  presumption  but  no  requirement  that  evidence  be  clear  and  convincing);  
Pennsylvania,   20   PA.   CONS.   STAT.   ANN.   §   6304   (West   2005);  Washington,  WASH.  
REV.  CODE  ANN.  §  30.22.100  (West  2005);  Wisconsin,  WIS.  STAT.  ANN.  §  705.04  (West  
2013);  Iowa,  IOWA  CODE  ANN.  §  524.806  (West  2012);  see  also  Peterson  v.  Corstenson,  
249   N.W.2d   622,   625   (1977)   (presumption   may   be   rebutted   by   “substantial  
evidence”);   In   re  Estate   of   Samek,   213  N.W.2d   690,   692   (1973)   (summarizing   law  
including   that   if   parties   were   in   confidential   relationship,   burden   shifts   to   the  
survivor).      New   York   has   a   unique   rule   that   is   most   closely   analogous   to   this  
category  of  states.   In  New  York,  use  of  survivorship  language  creates  a  rebuttable  
presumption.   N.Y.   BANKING   LAW   §   675   (McKinney   1982).   Without   survivorship  
language,   the   survivor   can   still   prove   ownership.      In   re   Estate   of   Corcoran,   63  
A.D.3d  93,  97-­‐‑98  (N.Y.  App.  Div.  2009);  In  re  Yaros,  90  A.D.3d  1063,  1064  (N.Y.  App.  
Div.  2011).  
   82.     This  presumption  in  favor  of  survivorship  is  also  inconsistent  with  modern  
rules   regarding   joint   tenancies   in   real   property.   Historically,   the   common   law  
presumed   joint   tenancy   with   survivorship   when   the   document   did   not   clearly  
specify  survivorship  rights.    This  was  based  on  “the  feudal  desire  to  keep  the  land  
in   a   single   ownership,   if   possible.”   JOHN   E.   CRIBBET   &   CORWIN   W.   JOHNSON,  
PRINCIPLES   OF   THE   LAW   OF   PROPERTY   107   (3d   ed.   1989).   “[T]he   common-­‐‑law  
presumption  has   been  universally   reversed”   regarding   real   property,   presumably  
because  it  may  be  inconsistent  with  the  parties’  intent,  and  now  tenancy  in  common  
is  presumed  unless   rebutted  by  some   type  of   survivorship   language.      Id.     Despite  
this  reversal,  and  despite  the  fact  that  the  historical  feudal  desires  that  support  the  
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According   to   the   Comment   to   Uniform   Probate   Code  
Section  6-­‐‑104,  the  rule  is  based  on  “[t]he  underlying  assumption  
[  ]  that  most  persons  who  use  joint  accounts  want  the  survivor  or  
survivors  to  have  all  balances  remaining  at  death.”83     However,  
the   comment   goes   on   to   acknowledge   that   “[t]his   assumption  
may   be   questioned   in   states.  .  .where   existing   statutes   and  
decisions  do  not  provide  any  safe  and  wholly  practical  method  
of  establishing  a  joint  account  which  is  not  survivorship.”84    The  
comment   notes   that   “use   of   a   form   negating   survivorship”85  
would   make   the   decedent’s   estate   the   legal   owner,   yet   still  
protect   banks  who  paid   the   survivor.      Therefore,   the   comment  
concludes  that  this  rule  allows  “a  safe  nonsurvivorship  account  
form”   and   predicts   that   the   presumption   will   “become  
increasingly  defensible.”86  
In   fact,   the   presumption   has   not   become   increasingly  
defensible.      Most   states   that   have   this   Uniform   Probate   Code  
section   or   a   similar   section   have   no   statutorily   mandated   or  
suggested   form.87      So   a   depositor   who   wants   to   use   a   bank  
account  as  a  convenience  account  –  a  durable  power  of  attorney  
substitute  –  may  have  no  obvious  alternative   to  a   joint  account  
that   after  his  death  will  be  held   to  have   created  a   survivorship  
right.     Unless   the   depositor   has   independent   knowledge   of   his  
ability   to   designate   that   the   account   is   without   survivorship  
rights,  he  is  totally  reliant  on  a  bank  employee  to  advise  about  of  
any   such   option.      Presuming   that   the   depositor   intends  
survivorship  rights   ignores  the  plausible  alternative  reasons  for  
opening  the  account.    This  presumption  of  survivorship  rights  is  
 
presumption   regarding   land   are   inapplicable   to   bank   accounts,   the   original  
Uniform  Probate  Code  and  those  states  using  the  same  approach  have  adopted  the  
analogous  presumption  that  depositors  have  created  survivorship  rights  instead  of  
agencies.  
   83.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑104  cmt.  (2004).    
   84.     Id.  
   85.     Id.  
   86.     Id.  
   87.     Only  Florida  has  a  statutory  example  of   the  form  of  a  contract  of  deposit,  
and   it   does   not   include   choices   for   convenience   or   agency   accounts.   FLA.   STAT.  
ANN.  §  655.82  (West  2013).  
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inconsistent   with   the   analogy   to   wills   formalities   because   the  
bank  account  formalities  are  not  convincing  indications  of  intent  
to  transmit  property  at  death.    A  depositor  is  presumed  to  have  
intended  to  benefit  the  survivor  with  only  slight  evidence  of  that  
intent   and   without   any   evidence   that   the   cautionary   function  
was  addressed.  
As   in   other   types   of   cases   requiring   clear   and   convincing  
evidence,   the   presumption   is   difficult   to   overcome.      For  
example,  contrary  provisions  in  a  will  are  usually  not  clear  and  
convincing   evidence   to   overcome   the   presumption.      In   states  
that   have   adopted   the   Uniform   Probate   Code   or   equivalent  
rules,   survivorship  rights   that  arise   in  a   joint  account  by  use  of  
the   word   “survivorship”   or   by   merely   adding   an   additional  
signer   cannot  be   changed  by  will.88     One   court  held   that   a  will  
executed   prior   to   the   time   the   joint   account  was   created   could  
not   even   be   considered   as   evidence   of   the   decedent’s   intent.89    
Similarly,   evidence   showing   the  decedent’s  “‘continuing   intent,  
over   substantial  periods  of   time,   to  dispose  of  her   estate   in   the  
manner  described  in  her  will’”  was  not  sufficient  to  overcome  a  
presumption  of  survivorship  in  a  bank  account,  even  though  the  
account  contained  “substantially  [her]  entire  estate.”90  
Some   states   have  made  overcoming   the  presumption   even  
 
   88.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §§  6-­‐‑104(e),  6-­‐‑213(b)  (2004).  Contra  MINN.  STAT.  ANN.  
§  524.6-­‐‑204(d)  (West  2012).  Interestingly,  the  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  PROP.:  WILLS  
&   DONATIVE   TRANSFERS   §   7.2   cmt.e   (2003)   recognizes   the   issue   of   attempted  
revocation  of  will  substitutes  by  a  later  will,  notes  that  the  courts  are  divided,  and  
recommends   that   the   financial   institution  pay   the   proceeds   as   directed  under   the  
will,  or  at  least  interplead  if  in  doubt.  This  is  flatly  contradictory  to  both  versions  of  
the   Uniform   Probate   Code,   which   prohibit   alteration   by   will.   The   Restatement  
comment   concludes   that   “[t]he   party   alleging   revocation   bears   the   burden   of  
proving   that   an   asserted   revocation   actually   referred   to   the   will   substitute   in  
question…”   and   that   “a  mere   residuary   clause   in   a   later  will”  would   not   suffice.    
John  H.  Langbein,  Major  Reforms  of  the  Property  Restatement  and  the  Uniform  Probate  
Code:     Reformation,  Harmless  Error,   and  Nonprobate  Transfers,   38  AM.  C.  OF  TRUST  &  
EST.  COUNS.  J.,  18-­‐‑19  (2013)  (noting  that  “courts  have  mostly  held  that  the  provision  
in   the   later  will   is   ineffective…[but]   that   the   better   solution   is   to   honor   the   later  
instrument,  in  order  not  to  defeat  the  transferor’s  intent.”).  
   89.     In  re  Estate  of  Cormier,  580  A.2d  157,  158  (Me.  1990)  (“the  record  contains  
no   evidence  of   any   contrary   intention   existing   at   the   critical  point,   namely,  when  
the  account  was  created.”).  
   90.     Thompson  v.  Barngrover,  680  P.2d  356,  358-­‐‑59  (N.M.  Ct.  App.  1984).  
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more  difficult   by   requiring   that   the   evidence   be   in  writing91   or  
specifically   refer   to   the   account   in   question.92      These  
requirements   make   the   presumption   even   less   defensible.93      A  
South   Carolina   case,   where   the   statute   requires   that   clear   and  
convincing  evidence  be  found  in  the  will   itself,   is  a  particularly  
egregious   illustration.      In   Estate   of   Chappell   v.   Gillespie,   the  
decedent,   Chappell,   executed   a   will   leaving   to   the   plaintiffs  
certain   real   estate,   about   $15,000   in   specific   devises,   and   three-­‐‑
quarters   of   the   residue,   and   leaving   to   the   defendant-­‐‑personal  
representative,   Gillespie,   one-­‐‑quarter   of   the   residue.94      Three  
days  later,  Chappell  went  with  Gillespie  to  the  bank  and  added  
Gillespie’s   name   to   the   checking   account.      A   bank   employee  
gave  Chappell  a  signature  card  that  created  a  joint  account  with  
survivorship   rights,   and   also   gave   him   a   32-­‐‑page   deposit  
agreement   that   explained   that   the   survivor   would   receive   the  
account   at   his   death.      The   bank   employee   told   Chappell   that  
Gillespie   would   be   able   to   write   checks   but   failed   to   mention  
that   Gillespie   would   also   receive   all   the   funds   at   Chappell’s  
death.     Chappell  signed  the  card,  which  also  acknowledged  his  
receipt   of   the   32-­‐‑page   agreement.     When   Chappell   died   a   few  
weeks   later,   the   account   contained   about   $81,000—nearly   half  
his   estate.95      The   appellate   court   affirmed   a   judgment  
notwithstanding   the   verdict   for   Gillespie.96      Noting   that   the  
statute   required   that   all   evidence   of   the   decedent’s   intent   be  
contained   in   the   will,   the   court   held   that   the   inconsistent  
provisions   in   the  will  and  the  fact   that,  without   the   funds  from  
the  bank  account,  the  assets  of  the  estate  were  insufficient  to  pay  
 
   91.     S.C.  CODE  ANN.  §  62-­‐‑6-­‐‑104.    
   92.     In   re   Estate   of   Butler,   803   N.W.2d   393   (Minn.   2011)   (interpreting   MINN.  
STAT.  ANN.  §  524.6-­‐‑204(a)  (West  2012)).  
   93.     The  author’s  experience  in  private  practice  and  in  supervising  a  law  school  
“wills  clinic”  is  that  most  clients  are  surprised  that  their  wills  do  not  supersede  their  
designations   in   will   substitutes.      This   makes   adequate   legal   advice   critical   and  
should  create  significant  concern  when  the  later  will  is  holographic  and  the  testator  
likely  had  no  legal  advice.  
   94.     Estate  of  Chappell  v.  Gillespie,  491  S.E.2d  267  (S.C.  Ct.  App.  1997).  
   95.     Id.  at  268.  
   96.     Id.  at  272.  
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the   specific   bequests,   did   not   amount   to   clear   and   convincing  
evidence.97  
One   court   opined   that   it   is   “difficult   for   an   estate   to  
overcome   the   statutory   presumption   through   the   use   of  
circumstantial  evidence.    In  the  absence  of  a  clear  statement  of  a  
contrary  intent  by  the  deceased,  or  evidence  of  a  contrary  intent  
based   upon   testimony   from   the   attorney   who   prepared   the  
probated   will,   a   bank   employee   or   a   person   with   special  
knowledge   regarding   the   decedent’s   estate   plan,   it   will   be  
difficult  for  the  estate  to  prevail  in  this  type  of  case.”98    So  only  in  
extremely   strong   cases   have   contestants   been   successful.      For  
example,  one  court  considered  a  prior  inconsistent  will  clear  and  
convincing  evidence  when  there  was  also  evidence  that  the  bank  
offered  no  joint  account  option  without  survivorship  rights,  and  
the   defendant   admitted   that   the   account  was   for   the   decedent’s  
convenience.99   In   another   case,   evidence   that   a   decedent   had  
medical  problems,  paid  one  bill  twice,  asked  two  of  his  children  
for   assistance   with   his   bank   account   and   added   one   son   as   a  
signer  on  the  account,  had  a  family  meeting  where  he  showed  all  
children  a  list  of  assets  including  the  bank  accounts  in  question,  
and  had  always  told  his  children  about  gifts  to  his  son  was  clear  
and  convincing  to  show  that  the  son  was  on  the  account  only  for  
convenience.100  
Thus,   the   presumption   can   lead   to   harsh   results.      The  
presumption   is   especially   unwarranted   without   evidence   that  
the  bank  offered  the  depositor  an  account  form  allowing  a  choice  
of   whether   to   provide   survivorship   rights   or   not.      Perhaps  
because   of   this   unfairness,   the   1989   version   of   the   Uniform  
 
   97.     Id.  at  271-­‐‑72.  
   98.     In  re  Estate  of  Combee,  583  So.  2d  708,  712-­‐‑13  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  1991).  
   99.     Williamson  v.  Echols,  422  S.E.2d  329,  330-­‐‑31  (Ga.  Ct.  App.  1992).  See  also  In  
re  Estate  of  Savage,  631  N.E.2d  797,  799-­‐‑800  (Ill.  App.  Ct.  1994)  (affirming  the  trial  
court’s  finding  that  a  prior  will  that  left  an  estate  to  three  children  equally,  evidence  
that  all  of  decedent’s  assets  were  placed  in   joint  account  when  decedent  knew  the  
assets  were  needed  for  his  care,  and  the  confidential  relationship  with  the  child  who  
was   co-­‐‑tenant   were   clear   and   convincing   to   overcome   the   presumption   of  
survivorship).  
   100.     King  v.  Estate  of  King,  554  So.  2d  600,  601  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  1989).  
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Probate  Code  addressed  this  problem.  
B.  REVISED  UNIFORM  PROBATE  CODE  (1989)101  
The  1989  version  of   the  Uniform  Probate  Code  overhauled  
the  rules  on   joint  bank  accounts102  and   included  a  standardized  
bank   account   form   that   gives   the   depositor   the   ability   to  
designate   his   intent   by   initialing   lines.      The   form   offers   a  
complete  array  of  choices,  including  pay-­‐‑on-­‐‑death  designations,  
rights   of   survivorship,   and   power-­‐‑of-­‐‑attorney   designations.      A  
serious   problem   with   the   form   is   that   it   may   not   be   easily  
understood   by   account   holders.103      But   if   the   form   is   used,   its  
 
   101.     The   Uniform   Multiple-­‐‑Person   Accounts   Act   was   incorporated   into   the  
Uniform  Probate  Code  as  sections  6-­‐‑201  through  6-­‐‑227.  Nine  states  and  the  District  
of  Columbia  use  this  regime:  Alabama,  ALA.  CODE  §§  5-­‐‑24-­‐‑1  to  5-­‐‑24-­‐‑34  (LexisNexis  
1996);  Alaska,  ALASKA   STAT.   §§   13.33.201   to   13.33.227   (1962);  Arizona,  ARIZ.   REV.  
STAT.  ANN.  §§  14-­‐‑6201  to  14-­‐‑6227  (2012);  Colorado,  COLO.  REV.  STAT.  §§  15-­‐‑15-­‐‑201  to  
15-­‐‑15-­‐‑227   (2013);  District  of  Columbia,  D.C.  CODE  §§  19-­‐‑602.01   to  19-­‐‑602.27   (2012);  
Montana,  MONT.  CODE  ANN.   §§   72-­‐‑6-­‐‑201   to   72-­‐‑6-­‐‑227   (West   2013);  Nebraska,  NEB.  
REV.  STAT.  §§  30-­‐‑2716  to  30-­‐‑2733  (2008);  New  Mexico,  N.M.  STAT.  ANN.  §§  45-­‐‑6-­‐‑201  
to  45-­‐‑6-­‐‑227  (2013);  North  Dakota,  N.D.  CENT.  CODE  §§  30.1-­‐‑31-­‐‑01  to  30.1-­‐‑31-­‐‑20  (2008);  
and   Rhode   Island,   R.I.   GEN.   LAWS   §   19-­‐‑9-­‐‑14.1   (2013).   Colorado   altered   the   Act  
regarding  the  rights  of  survivors  in  multiple-­‐‑party  accounts  by  adding  subsection  5  
to   section   6-­‐‑212   of   the   Uniform   Act.   See   COLO.   REV.   STAT.   §   15-­‐‑15-­‐‑212(5)   (2013).  
Subsection   5   provides   that   the   estate  may  prove   ownership   of   the   funds   by   clear  
and   convincing   evidence.      So   despite   enacting   the   model   account   form   and   the  
other  provisions  of  the  Act,  Colorado  retains  the  evidentiary  burdens  of  the  original  
Uniform  Probate  Code.    Michigan  has  not  adopted  the  Uniform  Probate  Code,  but  
its   joint   account   statutes   contain   similar   rules.     Michigan   statutes   provide   a   form  
that   is   conclusive   if   used  properly.  MICH.  COMP.  LAWS   §§   487.715   to   487.16   (West  
2005).  If  the  form  is  not  used  or  not  completed  entirely,  the  courts  look  to  prior  law  
to  determine  the  decedent’s  intent.    The  term  “survivor”  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  
intent   to  pass   the  property   to   the   survivor   at  death,   but   the  heirs   or   beneficiaries  
may  rebut.    MICH.  COMP.  LAWS  §  487.703  (West  2005);  Betker  v.  Ide,  55  N.W.2d  835,  
837-­‐‑38  (Mich.  1952).   In  2011,  Nevada  adopted  almost   identical  statutes.     NEV.  REV.  
STAT.  §§  111.783-­‐‑.815  (2011).  
   102.     The  1989  version   incorporates   the  Uniform  Multiple-­‐‑Person  Accounts  Act  
and  uses   the   term  “multiple  owners,”  but   the  definition   is   almost   identical   to   the  
previous   definition   of   a   “joint   account.”      See   UNIF.   PROBATE   CODE   §   6-­‐‑201(5)  
(amended  2008).  
   103.     As  discussed  infra  at  Part  III,  these  choices  may  be  quite  clear  to  a  lawyer,  
but   conclusively   presuming   that   the   hypothetical   elderly   person   discussed   above  
has  expressed  his  intent  on  the  form  seems  to  be  a  stretch.    The  depositor  is  unlikely  
to  have  a  lawyer  present  when  opening  the  account,  likely  has  not  had  legal  advice  
before   opening   the   account,   and  may   not   be   receiving   adequate   advice   from   the  
bank  employee  who  is  assisting  in  the  transaction.  
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indications  of   intent  are  binding,104   and   the   financial   institution  
is  protected  as  well.105     The  form  operates  along  with  section  6-­‐‑
212,  which  provides  that  the  funds  in  a  joint  account  pass  to  the  
survivor,  “unless  a  nonsurvivorship  arrangement  is  specified  in  
the   terms   of   the   account.”106      So   the   deposit   agreement   must  
explicitly   indicate   lack   of   survivorship;   if   it   does   not,  
survivorship  is  conclusively  presumed.    However,  if  the  form  is  
used  correctly,  no  presumption  is  ever  needed,  because  the  form  
instructs   the   depositor   to   select   and   initial   a   line   indicating  
whether  or  not  survivorship  rights  are  granted.  
However,   the   bank   is   not   required   to   use   the   statutory  
form.107      A   recent   case,   Krzycki   v.   Krzycki,108   clarified   the  
treatment  of  depositors  who  do  not  use  the  form  in  a  jurisdiction  
that   has   adopted   it   by   statute.      If   the   form   is   not   used,   the  
presumption   disappears,   and   the   court   must   determine   the  
depositor’s  intent.109    In  Krzycki,  an  account  holder  engaged  in  a  
series   of   transactions   where   she   opened   accounts   and  
transferred   funds.      Most   of   the   funds   came   from   annual  
payments   from   a   personal   injury   lawsuit   settlement   involving  
the  decedent  and  her  ex-­‐‑husband.    They  later  divorced,  and  the  
divorce  settlement  provided  that  the  decedent  would  receive  the  
payments   as   settlor,   trustee,   and   beneficiary   of   a   trust   she  
created.    At  her  death,  the  trust  proceeds  were  to  be  paid  to  her  
four   children   equally.      The   decedent   never   opened   a   bank  
account  for  the  trust,  but  the  court  traced  the  lawsuit  settlement  
proceeds  into  the  account  in  question.110    Instead  of  the  statutory  
form,   the   Wells   Fargo   Bank   deposit   agreement   listed   the  
 
   104.     See  UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑204(a)  (amended  2008)  (“A  contract  of  deposit  
that  contains  provisions  in  substantially  the  following  form  establishes  the  type  of  
account   provided,   and   the   account   is   governed   by   the   provisions   of   this   part  
applicable  to  an  account  of  that  type[.]”).  
   105.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §§  6-­‐‑221,  6-­‐‑222,  6-­‐‑226  (amended  2008).  
   106.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑212  cmt.  (amended  2008).  
   107.     See  UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑204(b)  (amended  2008)  (providing  alternative  
treatment  for  account  agreements  not  based  on  the  form).  
   108.     Krzycki  v.  Krzycki,  824  N.W.2d  659  (Neb.  2012).  
   109.     Id.  at  666.    
   110.     Id.  at  661-­‐‑64.  
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decedent  as  “Primary   Joint  Owner”  and  one  of  decedent’s   four  
children,   a   daughter,   as   “Secondary   Joint   Owner.”      Both   the  
decedent   and   her   daughter   signed   the   agreement.111      At   the  
decedent’s   death,   the   “Secondary   Joint  Owner”   transferred   the  
funds   into   her   own  name,   and   the   son  who  was   trustee   of   the  
trust  sued  for  conversion.112  
The  daughter  contended  that  she  was  entitled  to   the   funds  
because   as   “Secondary   Joint   Owner,”   she   had   survivorship  
rights.113      Thus,   the   court   had   to   determine   what   rights   were  
available   to   a   survivor   when   the   decedent   did   not   use   the  
statutory  form.    Section  6-­‐‑204  (b)  of  the  Uniform  Probate  Code114  
provides  that  a  deposit  agreement  that  is  not  substantially  in  the  
statutory   form   “is   governed   by   the   provisions   of   [this   part]  
applicable   to   the   type   of   account   that  most   nearly   conforms   to  
the  depositor’s  intent.”115    The  comment  to  section  204  directs  the  
court   to   section   203   to   determine   the   appropriate   type   of  
account.116      Section   203   provides   that   an   account   “is   either   a  
single-­‐‑party   account   or   a   multiple-­‐‑party   account,   with   or  
without   right   of   survivorship,   and   with   or   without   a   POD  
designation   or   an   agency   designation.”117      So   the   court   had   to  
decide  which   lines   the   decedent  would   have   checked,   had   the  
decedent  correctly  used  the  form  to  express  her  intent.  
Since   the   daughter   had   the   funds,   the   court   required   the  
trustee   to  prove   conversion.     First,   the   court   correctly   reasoned  
that   the   trustee   needed   proof   only   by   a   preponderance   of   the  
evidence,   because   the   1989   version   of   the   Code   requires   clear  
and   convincing   evidence   only   for   disputes   about   proportional  
ownership   during   the   parties’   lifetimes.118      The   court   relied   on  
 
   111.     Id.  at  663.  
   112.     Id.  at  664.  
   113.     Id.  
   114.     See  NEB.  REV.  STAT.  §  30-­‐‑2719(a)  (2008)  (cooresponding  Nebraska  statute).  
   115.     Krzycki,  824  N.W.2d  at  667.  
   116.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑204  cmt.  (amended  2008).  
   117.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑203(b)  (amended  2008).  
   118.     Krzycki,  824  N.W.2d  at  667.    During  the  parties’  joint  lifetimes,  funds  in  the  
account  belong  to  the  parties  “in  proportion  to  the  net  contribution  of  each…unless  
there  is  clear  and  convincing  evidence  of  a  different  intent.”    UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  
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the  divorce  decree  and  the  trust  document  executed  pursuant  to  
it   as   evidence   that   the   decedent   intended   the   account   funds   to  
pass  to  her  trust,  not  to  her  daughter.119    The  court  also  relied  on  
statements  in  the  decedent’s  will,  stating  her  intent  “to  have.  .  .at  
death,   a   bank   account   through   which   the   settlement  
proceeds.  .  .shall  pass”  and  that  “one  or  more.  .  .children  [would  
be]   listed   on   said   account   so   as   to   enable   them   to   obtain   the  
funds   for  distribution  according   to   this   [will].”120     Based  on   the  
documents   and   the   tracing   of   the   funds   to   the   settlement  
payments,  the  court  found  that  the  type  of  account  most  nearly  
conforming  to   the  depositor’s   intent  was  a  single-­‐‑party  account  
with  an  agency  designation.121    And  section  205  provides  that  an  
agent  has  no  rights  after  death  of  the  sole  party.122  
So  the  1989  Uniform  Probate  Code  changed  the  original  act  
in  two  respects  regarding  survivorship  rights,  and  both  changes  
improved   the   original.      First,   the   1989   version   relies   on   the  
depositor’s  use  of  a  form  to  express  intent,  and  that  expression  is  
binding.123      Putting   aside,   for   the   moment,   concerns   about   the  
depositor’s   understanding   of   the   form,   the   revised   UPC   rules  
that   apply   when   the   form   is   used   are   well   supported   by   the  
analogy   to   wills   formalities.      The   evidentiary   function   is  
 
6-­‐‑211(b)  (amended  2008).  
   119.     Krzycki,  824  N.W.2d  at  740.  
   120.     Id.  at  667.  
   121.     Id.  at  668.  
   122.     UNIF.   PROBATE   CODE   §   6-­‐‑205(c)   (amended   2008).   Although   the   court’s  
opinion   appears   clearly   correct   as   it   determined   the   decedent’s   intent,   an  
alternative,  formalistic  result  would  have  been  possible.    Section  6-­‐‑201(5)  defines  a  
“multiple-­‐‑party  account”  as  one  “payable  on  request  to  one  or  more  of  two  or  more  
parties,”  regardless  of  whether  survivorship  is  mentioned.      UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  
6-­‐‑201(5)   (amended   2008).   Nothing   in   the   deposit   agreement   indicated   any  
restrictions  on  either  joint  owner,  so  the  account  would  have  been  payable  to  either  
on   request   and   thus   would   have  met   the   definition   of   a   multiple-­‐‑party   account.    
Section   6-­‐‑212   provides   that   at   death   of   a   party   to   a   multiple-­‐‑party   account,   the  
funds  belong  to  the  survivor  unless  survivorship  rights  are  specifically  excluded  by  
the   account   agreement.   Id.     The   account   did   not  mention   survivorship   rights,   so  
under  this  reasoning,  the  joint  owner  would  be  entitled  to  the  account.    This  result  
would  be   inequitable  because   the  section  212  preference   for  survivorship  rights   is  
based  on  the  depositor’s  ability  to  designate  otherwise  on  the  form.    If  the  form  is  
not  used,  the  depositor  may  well  have  been  unable  to  make  any  such  designation.    
Thus,  the  court’s  analysis  was  both  technically  correct  and  fair.  
   123.     See  UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6  (1989).  
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arguably  met  because  the  depositor  has  indicated  in  a  witnessed  
writing  whether  he  or  she  intended  to  create  survivorship  rights.    
Similarly,   the   channeling   function   is   met   by   the   standardized  
words  of  survivorship  or  their  absence.    The  cautionary  function  
is   still   somewhat   suspect   because   there   is   no   cautionary  
language  on  the  form.    However,  the  form  does  have  a  heading,  
“rights   at   death,”   which   arguably   cautions   the   depositor   as  
much  as  a  retirement  beneficiary  designation.  
Second,   for   account-­‐‑holders  who   do   not   use   the   form,   the  
revised   UPC   has   eliminated   the   presumption   in   favor   of  
survivorship   and   eliminated   the   “clear   and   convincing”  
requirement   for   the   heirs’   or   beneficiaries’   evidence.      This   rule  
reflects   the   lack   of   analogy   to   the   wills   formalities   in   that  
situation.      Without   a   form   offering   different   options,  
assumptions   about   the   depositor’s   intent   are   not   supported   by  
any  formalities.    So  allowing  the  decedent’s  heirs  or  beneficiaries  
to   challenge   ownership   based   on   a   preponderance   standard   is  
consistent  with   the  ambiguous   indications  of   intent   that   can  be  
inferred   by   merely   opening   a   joint   account   or   adding   an  
authorized  signer.  
C.  “SURVIVORSHIP”  IS  CONCLUSIVE.  
In   jurisdictions   that   follow   this   approach,   use   of  
survivorship  language  conclusively  establishes  ownership  in  the  
survivor.124      Thus,   the   existence   of   survivorship   language  
 
   124.     These   jurisdictions   have   slight   variations,   but   all   can   be   generally  
categorized   as   following   this   approach:   Arkansas,   ARK.   CODE   ANN.   §   23-­‐‑32-­‐‑207  
(2012);   Williams   v.   Davis,   373   S.W.3d   381   (Ark.   Ct.   App.   2009);   Maryland,   MD.  
CODE  ANN.,  FIN.  INST.  §  1-­‐‑204  (LexisNexis  2011)  (providing  that  express  terms  are  
conclusive,   but   absent   express   terms,   funds   pass   to   survivor);   see   also   Stanley   v.  
Stanley,   927   A.2d   40   (Md.   Ct.   Spec.   App.   2007)   (confirming   this   interpretation  
where   parties   were   listed   as   “primary   owner”   and   “secondary   owner”);  
Mississippi,   Estate   of   Huddleston,   755   So.   2d   435,   439-­‐‑40   (Miss.   Ct.   App.   1999)  
(interpreting  bank  protection  statute,  MISS.  CODE  ANN.  §  81-­‐‑5-­‐‑63  (2001),  as  creating  
conclusive   presumption   if   survivorship   language   is   unambiguous);   Missouri,  
Maudlin   v.   Lang,   867   S.W.2d   514   (Mo.   1993)   (interpreting   MO.   ANN.   STAT.   §§  
362.470,   369.174   as   providing   that   titling   account   in   one   of   three   ways   –   joint  
tenants,   with   survivorship,   or   payable   to   any   of   the   depositors   –   conclusively  
determines  that  the  funds  pass  to  the  survivor);  Oklahoma,    In  re  Estate  of  Metz,  256  
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benefits  co-­‐‑tenants  in  these  states  more  than  in  original  Uniform  
Probate   Code   jurisdictions   where   co-­‐‑tenants   get   only   a  
presumption  of  survivorship.    In  that  respect,  these  jurisdictions  
are   even   more   favorable   to   claims   of   co-­‐‑tenants   than   the   old  
UPC   rules.      But   the   rules   in   these   states   vary   regarding  
ownership   when   survivorship   language   is   absent.      In   some  
states,  the  co-­‐‑tenant  must  prove  that  survivorship  was  intended.    
In  others,  particularly  Maryland,  Mississippi,  and  Missouri,   the  
presumption   of   survivorship   is   conclusive   even   if   the   account  
agreement  uses  only  the  term  “joint”  or  says  that   the  funds  are  
payable  to  “any”  of  the  authorized  signers.125  
Focusing   on   survivorship   language   is   consistent   with   the  
modern  development  of  the  law  regarding  joint  tenancies  in  real  
property.     Numerous  statutes  provide   that  express  declarations  
of   joint   tenancy   or   survivorship   are   sufficient   to   create  
survivorship   rights   in   real   property.126      However,   the   real  
property   statutes   also   provide   that   an   express   declaration   is   a  
necessary  condition  for  survivorship,  whereas  the  bank  account  
rules   of   jurisdictions   in   this   section   are  more   liberal   and   allow  
co-­‐‑tenants   to   prove   survivorship   rights   even   without   any  
express  declaration.  
A   recent   case   illustrates   the   unfairness   of   a   conclusive  
presumption.      In   In  re  Estate  of  Metz,   127   the  decedent  added  his  
nephew   to   an   account,   using   a   bank   signature   card   providing  
ownership  as  “joint   tenants  with   right  of   survivorship,  and  not  
as  tenants  in  common,  and  payable  to  either  during  the  lifetime  
 
P.3d   45   (Okla.   2011);  Tennessee,  TENN.  CODE  ANN.   §   45-­‐‑2-­‐‑703(e)   (2007);  Vermont,  
VT.  STAT.  ANN.  tit.  8,  §  14204  (2013)  (providing  for  conclusive  presumption;  neither  
the  statute  nor  cases  identify  the  rule  for  cases  where  survivorship  language  is  not  
used).  
   125.     MD.  CODE  ANN.,  FIN.  INST.  §  1-­‐‑204  (West  2011);  MISS.  CODE.  ANN.  §  81-­‐‑5-­‐‑63  
(2001);    MO.  REV.  STAT.  §  362.470  (1997).  
   126.     E.g.,  N.Y.  EST.  POWERS  &  TRUSTS  §  6-­‐‑2.2(b);  OKLA.  STAT.  ANN.   tit.  60,  §  74  
(West   2010).   In   one   respect,   some   of   these   real   property   statutes   are   even   more  
liberal   at   finding   joint   tenancies   than   the   counterpart   bank   account   rules   because  
the  statutes   require  only  a  declaration  of  “joint   tenancy,”  while   the  rules   for  bank  
accounts   in   many   of   these   jurisdictions   require   a   specific   reference   to  
“survivorship”  to  invoke  the  conclusive  presumption.  
   127.     Metz,  256  P.3d  45.  
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of   both   or   to   the   survivor(s)   after   the  death   of   one   of   them.”128    
The   court   held   that   this   language   conclusively   established  
ownership  in  the  nephew  as  surviving  joint  tenant.129    The  court  
declined  to  consider  evidence  outside  the  written  document  and  
instead   applied   rules   of   contract   construction   to   hold   that   the  
parties’   intent   was   unambiguously   expressed   within   the   four  
corners   of   the   contract.130      The   evidence   outside   the   written  
signature  card—evidence  that  the  majority  refused  to  consider—
was  that  the  parties  verbally  agreed  that  the  nephew  would  not  
use   the   account  during   the  decedent’s   life,   unless   the  decedent  
consented.      The  nephew  never   contributed  or  withdrew   funds.    
The  decedent’s  will  did  not  specifically  mention  the  account  and  
left  percentages  of   the   estate   to  various   relatives,   including   the  
nephew.131      Furthermore,   the   trial   court   had   found   that   other  
evidence   established   the  decedent’s   intent   that   the   account   “be  
used  for  his  medical  expenses  and  other  needs  during  his   life,”  
and   that   the   account   “be   the   property   of   his   estate   after   his  
death.”132    The  dissent  reasoned  that  the  evidence  was  clear  and  
convincing  and   thus  warranted  a   resulting   trust   in   favor  of   the  
will’s  beneficiaries.133  
The   majority   opinion   illustrates   the   problem   with   this  
conclusive   presumption   approach.      Nothing   in   the   opinion  
indicates   that   the   decedent   was   offered   other   signature   cards  
 
   128.     Id.  at  46-­‐‑47.        
   129.     Id.  at  49-­‐‑51.  
   130.     Id.  at  51.  
   131.     Id.  at  47.  
   132.     Id.  at  51  (Winchester,  J.,  dissenting).  
   133.     Id.  at  52.  “A  resulting  trust  arises  when  a  person  (the  “transferor”)  makes  
or   causes   to   be  made   a   disposition   of   property   under   circumstances   (i)   in  which  
some   or   all   of   the   transferor'ʹs   beneficial   interest   is   not   effectively   transferred   to  
others   (and   yet   not   expressly   retained   by   the   transferor)   and   (ii)   which   raise   an  
unrebutted  presumption   that   the   transferor  does  not   intend   the  one  who   receives  
the   property   (the   “transferee”)   to   have   the   remaining   beneficial   interest.”    
RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  §  7  cmt.a  (2003).     Here,  the  resulting  trust  would  
be   an   equitable  method   to   require   the   joint   tenant   to   deliver   the   property   to   the  
estate.  Rather   than  holding   that  no   survivorship   rights   existed,   the  dissent  would  
respect   the  survivorship  rights  as  delivering   legal   title   to   the   joint   tenant  but  hold  
that  he  impliedly  received  it  in  trust  for  the  estate  because  of  the  decedent’s  intent.  
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that   did   not   contain   survivorship   language   or   that   he  
understood  or  even  read  the  language  on  the  card.    A  scenario  at  
least  equally  likely  is  that  he  informed  a  bank  employee  that  he  
wanted  to  open  an  account  with  his  nephew,  the  bank  employee  
handed   him   a   signature   card,   and   both   parties   signed   it.    
Conclusively   presuming   intent   to   create   survivorship   rights,  
especially   in   view   of   evidence   that   the   decedent   intended   the  
account  to  be  used  for  his  medical  expenses,  elevates  form  over  
substance.      This   approach   also   lacks   policy   justification.      The  
evidentiary   and   channeling   functions   of   formalities   were   not  
met   because   there   was   no   evidence   that   the   decedent   was  
directed   to   think   about   rights   at   death,   other   than   the   mere  
presence   of   the   word   “survivorship,”   which   is   not   convincing  
absent  a  choice  of  other  language.    No  language  appeared  on  the  
signature  card  to  put  the  depositor  on  notice  that  the  card  would  
override  his  will  or  state  law,  so  the  cautionary  function  was  not  
met.    At  a  minimum,  the  will’s  beneficiaries  should  have  had  the  
opportunity   to   argue   for   a   resulting   trust   based  on   a   clear   and  
convincing   evidence   standard.      Even  more   fair,   because   of   the  
uncertainty   regarding   intent,   would   be   the   preponderance  
standard   used   in   modern   Uniform   Probate   Code   jurisdictions.    
Thus,  this  approach  is  much  more  rigid  and  weighted  in  favor  of  
survivorship   rights   than   either   version   of   the  Uniform  Probate  
Code.  
D.  SURVIVORSHIP  OR  ITS  ABSENCE  IS  CONCLUSIVE.  
Five  states,  either  by  statute  or  by  common-­‐‑law  rule,  require  
an   explicit   declaration   of   “survivorship”   rights   before   the  
surviving   co-­‐‑tenant   may   take   the   account.134      This   declaration  
 
   134.     The   five   states   are:   Texas,   Stauffer   v.   Henderson,   801   S.W.2d   858   (Tex.  
1990);  TEX.  ESTATES  CODE  §  113.151  (2014)  (formerly  cited  as  TEX.  PROB.  CODE  ANN.  
§  439(a)(West  2003)).  But   see  Holmes  v.  Beatty,   290  S.W.3d  852,   858-­‐‑60   (Tex.   2009)  
(incorporating   common   law   to   provide   different   rule   for   spouses’   community  
property);  Ohio,  Wright  v.  Bloom,  635  N.E.2d  31  (Ohio  1994);  North  Carolina,  In  re  
Estate  of  Frances,  394  S.E.2d  150  (N.C.  1990);  Kansas,  Johnson  v.  Capitol  Fed.  Sav.  &  
Loan  Ass’n,  524  P.2d  1127  (Kan.  1974);  and  New  Hampshire,  N.H.  REV.  STAT.  ANN.  
§  384:28  (2006);  see  also  Blais  v.  Colebrook  Guaranty  Sav.  Bank,  220  A.2d  763  (N.H.  
1966).      
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conclusively   establishes   ownership   in   the   surviving   co-­‐‑tenant,  
and,   in   absence   of   this   declaration,   conclusively   establishes  
ownership   in   the  decedent’s   estate.     Obviously,   this   bright-­‐‑line  
rule   has   the   advantages   of   certainty   and   eliminating   litigation.    
In   fact,   one   court   adopting   this   rule   stated   its   goal   to   avoid   a  
requirement   that   “lawyers,   trial   judges,   juries,   and   appellate  
judges   perform   post  mortem   cerebral   autopsies.  .  .to   determine  
and   second-­‐‑guess   what   the   subjective   intent   of   the   deceased  
joint   owner   of   the   account   was   at   the   time   the   account   was  
created.”135    This  approach  puts  all  the  emphasis  on  the  account  
agreement.      Essentially,   the   agreement   is   considered   an  
integrated  contract,  and  no  outside  evidence  is  allowed.  
If   a   depositor   clearly   has   the   option   to   either   elect  
survivorship   rights   or   none,   this   approach   appears   more   fair  
than   that   of   the   states   that   conclusively   presume   survivorship  
from   use   of   the   word   but   allow   co-­‐‑tenants   the   opportunity   to  
argue   for   survivorship   even   absent   such   language.      This   rule  
clearly  sets  forth  the  alternative  formalities  that  are  required  for  
the  account  to  be  treated  as  a  will  substitute:  explicit  reference  to  
survivorship.      Assuming   that   the   person   understands   the  
requirement   and   elects   survivorship,   the   signature   card  would  
provide  good  evidence  of  his  intent.    The  standardization  of  the  
required  term  and  use  of  the  signature  card  would  also  meet  the  
channeling   function   of   formalities,   giving   the   depositor  
confidence  that  his  intent  would  be  respected,  and  the  document  
could   fairly   be   considered   a   will   substitute.      If   the   depositor  
chooses   no   survivorship   rights,   then   conclusively   presuming  
that  there  are  none  also  is  warranted.  
 
   135.     Robinson  v.  Delfino,  710  A.2d  154,  160  (R.I.  1998).  The  court  also  noted  its  
impatience   with   joint   bank   account   litigation   by   stating,   “It   has   been   facetiously  
noted  that  there  are  two  ways  to  start  a  civil  action  in  this  state.  The  first  is  pursuant  
to  Super.  R.Civ.P.  3,  and  the  second  is  by  opening  a  joint  bank  account  with  right  of  
survivorship.”  Id.  at  156-­‐‑57  n.8.    In  2008,  the  legislature  adopted  in  substantial  part  
the   Uniform  Multiple-­‐‑Person   Accounts   Act,   R.I.   GEN.   LAWS   §19-­‐‑9-­‐‑14.1,   so   Rhode  
Island   is   not   listed   in   this   section.   The   conclusive   presumptions   are   the   same,   as  
long  as  the  form  is  used.  But  if  a  bank  fails  to  use  the  statutory  form,  an  “autopsy”  
will   now   be   required   to   determine   the   depositor’s   intent.   See   notes   108-­‐‑122   supra  
and  accompanying  text.  Strangely,  the  statutory  form  omits  the  option  of  an  agency  
account,  although  the  statute  itself  provides  for  it.  
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In   two  of   these   states,  Texas   and  North  Carolina,   the   state  
legislatures  have  taken  steps   to  ensure   that   the  evidentiary  and  
channeling  functions  are  met,  as  well  as  the  cautionary  function.    
Texas   has   adopted   a   statutory   form,   discussed   in   Part   III,   that  
presents   the  option  of   a   convenience  account  or  a   survivorship  
account,   among   other   alternatives.136      North   Carolina   statute  
requires  a  depositor  to  elect  survivorship  by  signing  a  statement  
“containing   language   set   forth   in   a   conspicuous   manner   and  
substantially   similar   to   the   following:   Upon   the   death   of   one  
joint  owner,  the  money  remaining  in  the  account  will  belong  to  
the   surviving   joint   owners   and  will   not   pass   by   inheritance   to  
the   heirs   of   the   deceased   joint   owner   or   be   controlled   by   the  
deceased   joint   owner’s  will.”137      Thus,   in   both   these   states,   the  
depositor  has  ample  opportunity  to  elect  survivorship  rights,  so  
relying  exclusively  on  that  election,  or  lack  thereof,  is  warranted.  
However,  three  of  these  five  jurisdictions,  New  Hampshire,  
Kansas,  and  Ohio,  have  declined  to  prescribe  forms  for  signature  
cards.      In  those  states,  assumptions  about  the  depositor’s   intent  
are  unwarranted.     Without   inquiry  into  the  options,   if  any,  that  
the   bank   provided   the   depositor,   there   is   no   basis   to   conclude  
that   the   evidentiary   function   or   the   channeling   functions  were  
met   by   the   mere   presence   or   absence   of   the   word  
“survivorship.”     Nor  does   the   informality  of   the  signature  card  
process   satisfy   the   cautionary   function   of   formalities.      So  
effectively,   the   only   difference   between   these   two   jurisdictions  
and  those  discussed  in  Part  II  (C)  above  is  that  the  unsupported  
conclusion  about   intent  equally  affects  the  rights  of   the  account  
survivor   and   the   beneficiaries   or   heirs   of   the   deceased  
depositor’s  estate.     All  are  bound  by  the  presence  or  absence  of  
one  term,  “survivorship.”  
 
   136.     TEX.   ESTATES   CODE   §   113.052   (2014)   (formerly   cited   as   TEX.   PROB.   CODE  
ANN.  §  439(a)(West  2003));  see  analysis  infra  Part  III  accompanying  note  156.    
   137.     N.C.  GEN.  STAT.  ANN.  §  53C-­‐‑6-­‐‑6  (West).      
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E.  “SURVIVORSHIP”  MAY  BE  OVERCOME  OR  STILL  REQUIRES  
SURVIVOR  TO  PROVE  OWNERSHIP.  
This  category   includes  all   jurisdictions   that   to  some  degree  
disfavor   those   claiming   survivorship   rights.      In   Delaware,138  
Massachusetts,   139   Wyoming,140   and   West   Virginia,141   use   of  
“survivorship”   language   is   required   to   create   survivorship  
rights,   but   its   presence   is   not   conclusive.      Even   with   that  
language   present,   those   claiming   through   the   estate,   will,   or  
trust   may   prove   that   the   decedent   intended   to   benefit   them  
instead   of   the   co-­‐‑tenant.      Louisiana   requires   proof   of   “an  
authentic   act   of   donation”—presumably   meaning   proof   of   a  
completed   gift—or   the   property   remains   in   the   estate   of   the  
decedent.142      Finally,   Idaho,   the   state   most   favorable   to   the  
beneficiaries  of  the  decedent’s  estate  or  will,  always  requires  the  
survivor   to   prove   by   clear   and   convincing   evidence   that   the  
decedent  intended  the  account  to  pass  to  the  survivor.143  
Obviously,   these   states   treat   the   claims   of   surviving   co-­‐‑
tenants  with   some   skepticism.     As  discussed   earlier,   in   light   of  
the  possible  alternative  reasons  for  creating  a  joint  bank  account  
and  the  lack  of  a  valid  analogy  between  the  wills  formalities  and  
the  formalities  associated  with  opening  joint  bank  accounts,  this  
skepticism   seems   valid.   Furthermore,   placing   the   burden   of  
proof  on  the  co-­‐‑tenant  or  allowing  the  will  beneficiaries  or  heirs  
to   attempt   to   overcome   the   use   of   survivorship   language   is  
 
   138.     Bothe  v.  Dennie,  324  A.2d  784,  788  (Del.  Super.  Ct.  1974).      
   139.     See   MASS.   GEN.   LAWS   ch.   167D,   §5;   Egan   v.   Deely,   282   N.E.2d   686,   686  
(Mass.  1972)  (requiring  rebuttal  by  preponderance  of  evidence).      
   140.     Nat’l  Bank  of  Newcastle  v.  Wartell,  580  P.2d  1142  (Wyo.  1978).  
   141.     W.  VA.  CODE  §  31A-­‐‑4-­‐‑33  (2009);  Lutz  v.  Orinick,  401  S.E.2d  464,  468  (W.  Va.  
1990).    
   142.     In  re  Succession  of  Bella,  75  So.  3d  972,  975  (La.  Ct.  App.  2011).      
   143.     Idaho  adopted  the  original  Uniform  Probate  Code  but  reversed  the  burden  
regarding   survivorship.   “Sums   remaining   on  deposit   at   the   death   of   a   party   to   a  
joint   account   belong   to   the   surviving   party   or   parties   as   against   the   estate   of   the  
decedent   if   an   intent   to  give   the   account   can  be   shown  by   the   surviving  party  or  
parties.”  IDAHO  CODE  ANN.  §  15-­‐‑6-­‐‑104  (2009).  The  court  in  In  re  Estate  of  Lewis,  543  
P.2d  852,  856  (Idaho  1975)  held  that   the  surviving  party  must  meet   the  burden  by  
clear  and  convincing  evidence,  consistent  with  prior  law  in  the  state.      
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consistent  with  recognition   that   the  decedent  may  have  had  no  
practical   way   to   open   the   account   as   a   durable-­‐‑power-­‐‑of-­‐‑
attorney  substitute.  
III.  STATUTORILY  MANDATED  UNIFORM  ACCOUNT  FORMS  
As   shown   above,   through   various   evidentiary   burdens,   the  
majority  of  states  strongly  favor  the  surviving  co-­‐‑tenant  over  the  
estate   of   the   deceased   depositor.      These   evidentiary   burdens  
exist   without   any   proof   that   the   depositor   actually   made   a  
conscious   choice   of   survivorship   rights,   or   in   original  Uniform  
Probate   Code   states,   without   any   evidence   that   the   depositor  
chose   survivorship   rights   at   all.      One   obvious   way   to   better  
ascertain  a  depositor’s  intent  is  use  of  a  deposit  agreement  form  
that  allows   the  depositor   to   indicate  whether  he  or   she   intends  
survivorship  rights  in  the  account.    Yet  only  a  few  states  offer  a  
standardized   form   at   all,   leaving   it   to   the   banks   to   provide  
agreements  without  any  guidance  from  the  state.  
The   most   commonly   used   standardized   form   is   the   1989  
Uniform  Probate  Code  uniform  bank  account  form,  designed  to  
allow  a  depositor   to   express  his   or   her   intent   about   ownership  
during  life,  rights  at  death,  and  power  of  attorney  designations.    
If   a   depositor   uses   the   form   correctly,   the   choices   are   binding,  
and   claimants’   rights   are   determined   by   statute.144      Based   on   a  
non-­‐‑scientific   sampling   of   non-­‐‑lawyers,   the   problem   with   the  
form  is  that  it  is  difficult  to  understand.  
The   form   appears   in   section   6-­‐‑204   (a)   and   is   reproduced  
below.145      The   first   choice   that   the   depositor   must   make   is  
 
   144.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑204(a)  (amended  2008).      
   145.     UNIFORM  SINGLE-­‐‑  OR  MULTIPLE-­‐‑PARTY  ACCOUNT  FORM    
PARTIES  [Name  One  or  More  Parties]:  
             OWNERSHIP  [Select  One  And  Initial]:  
_____  SINGLE-­‐‑PARTY  ACCOUNT  
_____  MULTIPLE-­‐‑PARTY  ACCOUNT  
     
Parties  own  account  in  proportion  to  net  contributions  unless  there  is  
clear  and  convincing  evidence  of  a  different  intent.  
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whether   the   account   is   a   “single-­‐‑party   account”   or   “multiple-­‐‑
party   account.”      The   form   does   not   define   these   two   types   of  
accounts,  so  the  depositor  must  choose  based  on  his  or  her  own  
understanding   of   these   terms.      The   only   guidance   is   the  
additional   language   about   ownership   “in   proportion   to   net  
 
  RIGHTS  AT  DEATH  [Select  One  And  Initial]:  
_____  SINGLE-­‐‑PARTY  ACCOUNT  
     
At  death  of  party,  ownership  passes  as  part  of  party'ʹs  estate.  
_____  
SINGLE-­‐‑PARTY  ACCOUNT  WITH  POD  (PAY  ON  DEATH)  
DESIGNATION  
     
[Name  One  Or  More  Beneficiaries]:  
     
         
     
At  death  of  party,  ownership  passes  to  POD  beneficiaries  and  is  not  
part  of  party'ʹs  estate.  
_____  MULTIPLE-­‐‑PARTY  ACCOUNT  WITH  RIGHT  OF  SURVIVORSHIP  
     
At  death  of  party,  ownership  passes  to  surviving  parties.  
_____  
MULTIPLE-­‐‑PARTY  ACCOUNT  WITH  RIGHT  OF  SURVIVORSHIP  AND  
POD  (PAY  ON  DEATH)  DESIGNATION  
      [Name  One  Or  More  Beneficiaries]:  
     
         
     
At  death  of  last  surviving  party,  ownership  passes  to  POD  beneficiaries  
and  is  not  part  of  last  surviving  party'ʹs  estate.  
_____  MULTIPLE-­‐‑PARTY  ACCOUNT  WITHOUT  RIGHT  OF  SURVIVORSHIP  
     
At  death  of  party,  deceased  party'ʹs  ownership  passes  as  part  of  
deceased  party'ʹs  estate.  
  AGENCY  (POWER  OF  ATTORNEY)  DESIGNATION  [Optional]  
     
Agents  may  make  account  transactions  for  parties  but  have  no  
ownership  or  rights  at  death  unless  named  as  POD  beneficiaries.  
     
[To  Add  Agency  Designation  To  Account,  Name  One  Or  More  Agents]:  
     
         
        
[Select  One  And  Initial]:  
     
______  AGENCY  DESIGNATION  SURVIVES  DISABILITY  OR  
INCAPACITY  OF  PARTIES  
     
______  AGENCY  DESIGNATION  TERMINATES  ON  DISABILITY  OR  
INCAPACITY  OF  PARTIES  
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contributions”   that   appears   after   the  multiple-­‐‑party   heading.146    
No  similar  guidance  appears  after  the  single-­‐‑party  heading.    The  
hypothetical   elderly   person  mentioned   at   the   beginning   of   this  
article,  who  wants  to  use  the  account  to  allow  a  relative  to  write  
checks   in   case   of   incapacity,   may   well   think   that   wanting   an  
additional   signer   requires   a   multiple-­‐‑party   account.147      In   fact,  
this  account  should  be  a  single-­‐‑party  account  because  the  elderly  
person   does   not   intend   that   the   additional   signer   have   any  
ownership  rights  or  any  right  to  contribute  funds  to  the  account.  
Only  by  examining  the  statutory  definitions  in  section  6-­‐‑201  
does  this  distinction  become  somewhat  clear.    A  “multiple-­‐‑party  
account”  is  one  that  is  “payable  on  request  to  one  or  more  of  two  
or  more  parties,”148  and  a  “party”  is  “a  person  who,  by  the  terms  
of  an  account,  has  a  present  right,  subject  to  request,  to  payment  
from   the  account  other   than  as  a  beneficiary  or   agent.”149     What  
our   elderly   person   wants   is   an   agent.150   Therefore,   he   or   she  
should  choose  a  single-­‐‑party  account.    Then  at  the  next  decision  
point,  “rights  at  death,”  he  or  she  should  choose  the  first  of  the  
two   single-­‐‑party   options,   which   provides   that   “ownership  
passes  as  part  of  the  party’s  estate.”151    Finally,  he  or  she  needs  to  
proceed   to   the   optional   agency   designation,   and   initial   the  
choice   that   the   agency   will   survive   parties’   “disability   or  
incapacity.”152      The   additional   language   on   the   form   offered   to  
explain  agency  mirrors  the  statutory  definitions  and  informs  the  
depositor   that   the   agent   “may  make   account   transactions”   but  
will  “have  no  ownership  or  rights  at  death.”153     If  our  depositor  
 
   146.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑204(a)  (amended  2008).      
   147.     Even   a   legal   expert   has   recently   written   that   this   is   the   correct   choice.  
Charles  P.  Sabatino,  Damage  Prevention  and  Control  for  Financial  Incapacity,  305  J.  AM.  
MED.   ASS’N   707,   707-­‐‑08   (2011).   This   would   be   true   only   in   states   such   as   Rhode  
Island  that  use  the  form  but  omit  the  choice  of  an  agency  designation.      
   148.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑201(5)  (amended  2008).  
   149.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑201(6)  (amended  2008)  (emphasis  added).      
   150.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §§  6-­‐‑201(2),  6-­‐‑211(d)  (amended  2008)  (“An  agent  in  an  
account  with  an  agency  designation  has  no  beneficial  right  to  sums  on  deposit.”).  
   151.     See  UNIFORM  SINGLE-­‐‑  OR  MULTIPLE-­‐‑PARTY  ACCOUNT  FORM,  supra  
note  145.  
   152.     Id.  
   153.     Id.  
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correctly   chooses   and   initials   these   three   lines,   then   his   or   her  
intent  will  be  clear  and  respected.  
Suppose,   instead,   that   the   depositor   opts   for   the  multiple-­‐‑
party   account   at   the   initial   decision   point   above,   thinking   that  
the  additional   signer   is  a  “party.”     This   is   likely,  given   that   the  
form   does   not   define   either   “party”   or   “single-­‐‑party   account.”    
To  effectuate   the  desire   that   the  account  pass  by  will   or  by   the  
law   of   intestacy,   the   person   would   next   initial   the   line   for  
“multiple-­‐‑party   account   without   right   of   survivorship.”154      By  
initialing  these  two  lines,  has  the  person  created  different  rights  
than   when   he   or   she   made   the   single-­‐‑party   agency   choices  
above?      The   answer   is   yes:   only   slightly,   but   possibly  
significantly.      Under   this   scenario,   the   additional   signer   may  
withdraw   funds   during   the   life   of   the   other   party,155   but   the  
additional  signer  does  not  have  an  agency  relationship  with  the  
elderly  person.    So  several  disputes  could  arise  and  make  it  more  
difficult  for  the  elderly  person’s  desired  beneficiaries.  
First,  the  two  parties  now  own  the  account  in  proportion  to  
their  net  contributions.156    One  can  envision  a  scenario  where  the  
additional  signer  makes  contributions  to  the  account,  payments  
are   then   made   from   the   account,   and   a   dispute   arises   about  
which   party’s   funds   should   be   charged   with   the   payments.    
Second,   because   the   additional   signer   has   none   of   the   legal  
duties  of  an  agent,157  what  is  the  treatment  of  withdrawals  made  
by   the   additional   signer?      The   parties   own   the   account   in  
proportion   to   their  net  contributions,  and  courts  have  held   that  
the  same  rule  applies  to  funds  that  have  been  expended  from  the  
account.158      But   the   official   comment   notes   that   “parties   to  
 
   154.     Id.  
   155.     Compare  UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑211(d)  (During  the  lifetime  of  any  party,  
“An  agent  in  an  account  with  an  agency  designation  has  no  beneficial  right  to  sums  
on  deposit.”)  with  section  6-­‐‑201(6)  “‘Party’  means  a  person  who,  by  the  terms  of  an  
account,  has  a  present  right,  subject  to  request,  to  payment  from  the  account  other  
than  as  a  beneficiary  or  agent.”      
   156.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑211(a)-­‐‑(b)  (amended  2008).      
   157.     See  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  AGENCY  §§  8.01  to  8.12  (2006).      
   158.     In  re  Estate  of  Jones,  826  N.W.2d  540,  544-­‐‑46  (Minn.  Ct.  App.  2012);  Kemp  
v.  Rawlings,  594  S.E.2d  845,  850  (S.C.  2004).      
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accounts   [may]   be   as   definite,   or   as   indefinite,   as   they  wish   in  
respect   to   the   matter   of   how   beneficial   ownership   should   be  
apportioned   between   them.”159      The   additional   signer   could  
argue  plausibly   that  had   the   initial  depositor   intended   that   the  
funds   be   spent   only   on   the   depositor’s   behalf,   the   depositor  
would   have   chosen   an   agency   account.      Because   he   or   she  
instead  chose  a  multiple-­‐‑party  account,  the  depositor  must  have  
intended   that   the   additional   signer   have   rights   to   withdraw  
during   their   joint   lives.160      This  would   complicate   the   intended  
beneficiaries’   claim   for   conversion  against   the  additional   signer  
because  the  additional  signer  can  argue  the  issue  of  intent.    The  
statute   and   the   form   provide   that   the   funds   are   owned   in  
proportion   to   net   contributions,   “unless   there   is   clear   and  
convincing   evidence   of   a   different   intent.”161      This   allows   the  
additional  signer  an  avenue  to  claim  ownership  of   the  funds   in  
the   account   both   during   their   joint   lives   and   at   the   depositor’s  
death,   albeit   at   a   heightened   standard   of   proof.      Unlike   the  
agency   account,   which   terminates   at   death   of   the   principal,162  
death  of  the  depositor  would  not  conclusively  end  any  claim  of  
the  additional  signer.163  
In   view   of   the   potential   problems   created   by   a   multiple-­‐‑
party   account   without   survivorship,   one   has   to   wonder   who  
would  want   to  create   this   type  of  account   instead  of  an  agency  
account.     Why  would   a   person  want   an   additional   signer  who  
has   lifetime   rights   to   withdraw   but   no   agency   obligations  
 
   159.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑211  cmt.  (amended  2008).      
   160.     The   bank   is   protected   when   paying   either   a   party   in   a   multiple-­‐‑party  
account  or  an  agent  in  an  agency  account,  so  the  distinction  is  relevant  only  to  the  
additional  signer.  UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §§  6-­‐‑222,  6-­‐‑224  (amended  2008).  
   161.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑211(b)  (amended  2008).      
   162.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑205(c)  (amended  2008).      
   163.     This  is  because  without  a  right  of  survivorship,  “the  amount  to  which  the  
decedent,  immediately  before  death,  was  beneficially  entitled  under  Section  6-­‐‑211  is  
transferred  as  part  of  the  decedent’s  estate.”  UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑212(c)  (2008).  
The  decedent’s  share  under  6-­‐‑211  is  subject  to  the  “clear  and  convincing  evidence”  
standard  that  could  allow  the  survivor  to  argue  that  the  parties  had  an  ownership  
agreement  different  from  net  contributions.  Both  cases  cited  above  in  note  151,  In  re  
Estate  of  Jones,  826  N.W.2d  540,  546  (Minn.  Ct.  App.  2012);    Kemp  v.  Rawlings,  594  
S.E.2d  845,  850  (S.C.  2004),  allowed  evidence  of   intent   to  benefit   the  survivor  who  
had  withdrawn  the  funds.  
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attached   to   the   withdrawals?      Hypothesizing   two   parties,   the  
two  parties  would  have  to  want  an  account  that  contained  funds  
of  both,  or  funds  of  one  that  were  available  to  the  other.    During  
their   joint   lifetimes,   they  would  not   limit  each  other’s  ability   to  
access   those   funds,   because   the   bank   is   allowed   to   pay   either  
party.164      At   death,   however,   the   account  would   be   segregated  
into   the   remaining   net   contributions   of   each   party,   and   the  
deceased  party’s   share  would  pass   to  his  heirs  or  beneficiaries.    
Perhaps   this  would   apply   to   a  married   couple   or   life   partners  
who  wish   to  have   a   shared   account  during   their   joint   lives   yet  
retain   individual   ownership   of   their   portion   of   the   funds   at  
death.     The  drafters  of   this   section  believed   this   to  be   the  most  
common   situation   and   that   depositors   in   multiple-­‐‑party  
accounts   “usually   intend[]   no   present   change   of   beneficial  
ownership.”165      This   may   well   be   true   in   the   sense   that   the  
parties  do  not  intend  an  irrevocable  gift;  they  retain  the  ability  to  
withdraw  the   funds   to   the  extent   they  remain   in   the  account.166    
But   the   potential   problems   with   this   type   of   arrangement,   as  
detailed  above,  counsel  in  favor  of  funding  such  an  account  only  
with  an  amount   that   the  parties  do  not  mind  commingling  and  
risking   that   the   funds   would   not   pass   to   their   other   heirs   or  
beneficiaries  at  death.167    Providing  this  option  along  with  single-­‐‑
party  accounts  and  agency  accounts  on  the  same  form  interjects  
confusion.    Especially  given  the  limited  explanatory  notes  on  the  
 
   164.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §§  6-­‐‑221,  6-­‐‑222  (amended  2008).      
   165.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑211  cmt.  (amended  2008).      
   166.     See   Carolyn   Satenberg,   Joint   Bank   Accounts   in   New   York:      Confusion,  
Discrimination,  and  the  Need  for  Change,  9  Cardozo  Pub.  L.  Pol’y  &  Ethics  J.  607,  
634-­‐‑35   (2011)   (quoting   legislative   history   of   New   York   joint   deposit   law   for  
proposition   that   90%   of   people   surveyed   did   not   know   that   New   York   law  
provided  equal  ownership  of  joint  deposits  and  arguing  that  “net  contribution”  rule  
of  Uniform  Probate  Code  should  be  adopted).     This  is  also  consistent  with  the  gift  
tax  treatment  of  deposits  into  multiple-­‐‑party  accounts.  Deposits  are  not  considered  
gifts  until  the  co-­‐‑tenant  withdraws  funds.  26  C.F.R.  §  25.2511-­‐‑1(h)(4)  (2013).      
   167.     “The  section  does  not  undertake  to  describe  the  situation  between  parties  if  
one  party  withdraws  more   than   that  party   is   then  entitled   to   as   against   the  other  
party.     Sections  6-­‐‑221  and  6-­‐‑226  protect  a  financial   institution  in  that  circumstance  
without  reference  to  whether  a  withdrawing  party  may  be  entitled  to  less  than  that  
party   withdraws   .   .   .   .   Rights   between   parties   in   this   situation   are   governed   by  
general  law  .  .  .  .”    UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑211  cmt.  (amended  2008).      
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form,  a  depositor  could  easily  make  the  wrong  choice.  
These  concerns  about  complexity  and  understandability  are  
supported   by   the   results   of   a   small   survey   conducted   by   the  
author.      The   survey   asked   twenty   adults   to   assume   that   they  
were   elderly,   unmarried,   and   concerned   about   ability   to   pay  
bills   in   case   of   illness.      They  were   to   further   assume   that   they  
had   three   children  and  wanted   the  one  who   lived  closest   to  be  
able  to  sign  checks  if  necessary.    At  death,  the  funds  were  to  pass  
as  part  of  the  estate,  which  would  give  them  to  all  three  children  
equally,  rather  than  to  the  child  who  was  the  authorized  signer.    
Each   person   was   asked   to   fill   out   the   Uniform   Probate   Code  
form,  initialing  the  appropriate  lines.    Only  three  correctly  chose  
a   single-­‐‑party   account   and   designated   an   agent   (one   of   those  
three  had  previously  worked  at  a  bank).  
Many  struggled  with  whether  the  account  was  single-­‐‑party  
or  multiple-­‐‑party.     Seven  chose  multiple-­‐‑party  account  without  
survivorship,   plus   an   agency   designation.      Although   the   form  
does   not   explicitly   prohibit   this,   the   statute   provides   that   an  
agent  must   be   a  person  other   than   a  party.168      Therefore,   if   the  
bank   did   not   require   the   depositor   to   correct   this   error,  
presumably,  the  agency  designation  would  not  be  valid,  and  the  
account   would   remain   a   multiple-­‐‑party   account   without  
survivorship.    As  discussed  above,  this  is  not  ideal.  
Others  created  multiple-­‐‑party  accounts  with  the  authorized  
signer,   either   with   or   without   survivorship   rights,   and   made  
pay-­‐‑on-­‐‑death  designations   to  all   three   children.     Both   these  are  
problematic.     First,  “[a  pay-­‐‑on-­‐‑death]  designation  in  a  multiple-­‐‑
party   account   without   right   of   survivorship   is   ineffective.”169    
Second,  a  pay-­‐‑on-­‐‑death  designation   to  all   three  children  would  
be   ineffective   for   practical   purposes   in   an   account   that   is  
multiple-­‐‑party  with  survivorship.    The  pay-­‐‑on-­‐‑death  designation  
 
   168.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑205(a)  (amended  2008).      
   169.     UNIF.   PROBATE   CODE   §   6-­‐‑212(c)   (amended   2008).   Presumably,   this   is  
because  the  bank  would  not  know  which  funds  belonged  to  the  survivor  and  which  
to  the  decedent.  
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only  operates  on  the  death  of  the  last  party  to  die.170    At  the  first  
death,  presumably  that  of  the  elderly  depositor,  the  funds  would  
belong   to   the   survivor171   —the   child   who   should   have   been  
designated   as   an   agent.      Only   if   that   child   were   to   leave   the  
funds  in  the  account  until  his  or  her  own  death  would  the  pay-­‐‑
on-­‐‑death  designation  ever  operate:  an  unlikely  event.  
This  survey  illustrates  the  weakness  of  the  Uniform  Probate  
Code  form.     Assuming  that  even  the  majority  of  depositors  can  
navigate   the   form   correctly   is   unwarranted.      The   form   uses  
numerous  legal  terms,  most  without  even  a  hint  of  explanation.    
A   depositor   is   expected   to   distinguish   between   single-­‐‑party  
accounts   and   multiple-­‐‑party   accounts,   and   understand   the  
meaning  of  net  contributions  and  clear  and  convincing  evidence.    
He   or   she   must   discern   the   difference   between   right   of  
survivorship   and   pay-­‐‑on-­‐‑death   designations.      The   depositor  
must  know  that  he  or  she  needs  an  agency  account  or  power  of  
attorney,   and  decide  whether   the  power  “survives.  .  .incapacity  
of  parties.”172    The  form  seems  more  designed  to  be  a  law  school  
exam   question   than   something   an   average   depositor   could  
complete.  
Presumably,   the   drafters   of   the   form   intended   that   bank  
employees   would   provide   advice   and   assistance.      This  
assumption  may  well   be   unwarranted.      One   author   has   noted  
that   “[e]ven   with   the   [Uniform   Probate   Code],   financial  
institutions   have   little   incentive   to   recommend   alternatives   to  
the   traditional   joint   account   because   it   takes   more   time   and  
money   to   train   employees   to   explain   the   different   kinds   of  
accounts   and   forms   to   the   customer.”173      Further,   advice   from  
bank  employees  may  be   inconsistent  or   incorrect.174      So  a  more  
 
   170.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑212(b)(2)  (amended  2008).      
   171.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑212(a)  (amended  2008).      
   172.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑204(a)  (amended  2008).      
   173.     Sabatino,  supra  note  147.  
   174.     See,   e.g.,   Sheri   Brown,   The   Statutory   Convenience   Account:      A   Viable  
Solution  to  Unnecessary  Joint  Account  Litigation,  21  DCBA  BRIEF  24,  31  n.89  (2008)  
(describing   errors   in   advice   about   account   types   from   bank   employees).   The  
author’s  experience  as  an  estate  planner   in  a  non-­‐‑Uniform  Probate  Code  state  has  
also   been   that   bank   employees   often   may   not   accurately   convey   the   options  
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user-­‐‑friendly   form,   with   explanations   of   terms   and  
consequences,  would  be  in  order.175  
Three  problems  seem  to  be  the  primary  causes  of  confusion  
about  the  form.    First,  the  term  “party”  has  a  technical  meaning,  
and   the   form  does  not  define   it.      The  word  “owner”  would  be  
more   understandable   to   a   non-­‐‑lawyer   and   serve   the   same  
purpose.176    The  statute  defines  a  “party”  as  a  person  who  has  a  
present  right  to  payment,  who  is  not  a  beneficiary  or  agent.     To  
most   people,   that   person   would   surely   be   considered   an  
“owner”   of   the   account.      Second,   again   as   evidenced   by   the  
survey,  many  people  do  not  understand  the  distinction  between  
pay-­‐‑on-­‐‑death   and   survivorship.     What   is   the   difference?      Both  
provide   a   payment   at   death.      Survivorship   rights   require  
payment   to   a   “party”  whereas   “pay-­‐‑on-­‐‑death”  means  payment  
to  a  beneficiary—one  who  is  not  a  party.177    Would  not  a  simpler  
solution   be   to   establish   a   heading,   “rights   at   death,”   and   leave  
space  for  the  names  of  those  who  are  entitled  to  the  funds  at  the  
death   of   either   or   both   owners,   or   to   specifically   ask   whether  
funds  are  to  pass  to  the  survivor?    Finally,  and  not  surprisingly,  
judging  from  the  dearth  of  survey  participants  who  selected  an  
 
available  to  a  depositor.  
   175.     Reliance  on  bank  employees   for   legal   advice   is   subject   to  other   criticisms  
that  may  not  be  cured  by  a  more  understandable  account  form.  For  example,  no  one  
without   legal   training   could   be   expected   to   provide   advice   about   issues   such   as  
whether   creditors  of   the   co-­‐‑tenant  may   reach   the   entire   account  balance,  how   the  
lapse   or   anti-­‐‑lapse   rules   operate   for   survivorship   accounts   and   pay-­‐‑on-­‐‑death  
designations,  or  how  the  rules  of  particular  states  determine  whether  designations  
in  subsequent  wills  revoke  or  override  the  designations  in  the  account  contract.    For  
example,   as   to   the   latter,   the   Uniform   Probate   Code   requires   a   signed   writing  
delivered   to   the   bank.      UNIF.   PROBATE   CODE   §   6-­‐‑213(a)   (amended   2008).   But   the  
RESTATEMENT   (THIRD)   OF   PROPERTY:      WILLS   AND   OTHER   DONATIVE   TRANSFERS  
(2003)  recognizes  differences  in  states’  laws  on  the  subject,  as  noted  in  the  comment  
following  UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑213  (amended  2008).  See,  e.g.,  S.C.  CODE  ANN.  §  
62-­‐‑6-­‐‑104   (2013)   and  Abernathy   v.   Latham,   545   S.E.2d   848   (Ga.   2001)   (interpreting  
statute  to  require  writing  delivered  to  bank  or  specific  reference  to  bank  account  in  
subsequent  will).     All  of   these  considerations  could  change  a  depositor’s  choice  of  
account   type.   Furthermore,   bank   employees   are   likely  unaware  of   the  depositor’s  
complete   estate   plan   and   family   situation.   Kent   D.   Schenkel,   Testamentary  
Fragmentation  and  The  Diminishing  Role  Of  The  Will:  An  Argument  For  Revival,  
41  Creighton  L.  Rev.  155,  162  (2008).      
   176.     Cf.  MICH.  COMP.  LAWS  §  487.715  (2005)  (using  the  word  “person”  and  then  
asking  “who  owns  the  funds[?]”).      
   177.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑201(3),  (6)  (amended  2008).      
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agency   designation,   many   people   do   not   understand   the   legal  
definition   of   “agency.”      Presumably,  most   rule   out   that   choice  
because  they  assume  that  it  has  the  meaning  given  in  one  of  the  
first   three   definitions   from   a   popular   online   dictionary:   “an  
organization,  company,  or  bureau  that  provides  some  service  for  
another:   a   welfare   agency.   2.   a   company   having   a   franchise   to  
represent   another.   3.   a   governmental   bureau,   or   an   office   that  
represents   it.”178      All   of   these   definitions   obviously   seem  
irrelevant  to  the  task  at  hand—adding  an  additional  authorized  
signer  to  help  with  bill  payment—so  the  depositor  makes  other  
choices.  
Other   states   also   have   statutory   forms.      The   form   used   in  
Texas179  addresses  many  of   these  concerns.     First,   the  top  of   the  
 
   178.     Agency,  DICTIONARY.COM  (2014),  
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/agency?s=t  (emphasis  omitted).  
   179.     
  UNIFORM  SINGLE-­‐‑PARTY  OR  MULTIPLE-­‐‑PARTY  ACCOUNT  SELECTION  
FORM  NOTICE:    The  type  of  account  you  select  may  determine  how  property  
passes  on  your  death.    Your  will  may  not  control  the  disposition  of  funds  held  in  
some  of  the  following  accounts.    You  may  choose  to  designate  one  or  more  
convenience  signers  on  an  account,  even  if  the  account  is  not  a  convenience  account.    
A  designated  convenience  signer  may  make  transactions  on  your  behalf  during  
your  lifetime,  but  does  not  own  the  account  during  your  lifetime.    The  designated  
convenience  signer  owns  the  account  on  your  death  only  if  the  convenience  signer  
is  also  designated  as  a  P.O.D.  payee  or  trust  account  beneficiary.  
Select  one  of  the  following  accounts  by  placing  your  initials  next  to  the  
account  selected:  
___  (1)    SINGLE-­‐‑PARTY  ACCOUNT  WITHOUT  "ʺP.O.D."ʺ  (PAYABLE  
ON  DEATH)  DESIGNATION.    The  party  to  the  account  owns  the  account.    On  the  
death  of  the  party,  ownership  of  the  account  passes  as  a  part  of  the  party'ʹs  estate  
under  the  party'ʹs  will  or  by  intestacy.  
Enter  the  name  of  the  party:  
______________________________  
Enter  the  name(s)  of  the  convenience  signer(s),  if  you  want  one  or  more  
convenience  signers  on  this  account:  
______________________________  
______________________________  
___  (2)    SINGLE-­‐‑PARTY  ACCOUNT  WITH  "ʺP.O.D."ʺ  (PAYABLE  ON  
DEATH)  DESIGNATION.    The  party  to  the  account  owns  the  account.    On  the  
death  of  the  party,  ownership  of  the  account  passes  to  the  P.O.D.  beneficiaries  of  the  
account.    The  account  is  not  a  part  of  the  party'ʹs  estate.  
Enter  the  name  of  the  party:  
EDDINGTON  MACRO.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   6/13/14    10:13  AM  
2014]   SURVIVORSHIP  RIGHTS   221  
 
______________________________  
Enter  the  name  or  names  of  the  P.O.D.  beneficiaries:  
______________________________  
______________________________  
Enter  the  name(s)  of  the  convenience  signer(s),  if  you  want  one  or  more  
convenience  signers  on  this  account:  
______________________________  
______________________________  
___  (3)    MULTIPLE-­‐‑PARTY  ACCOUNT  WITHOUT  RIGHT  OF  
SURVIVORSHIP.    The  parties  to  the  account  own  the  account  in  proportion  to  the  
parties'ʹ  net  contributions  to  the  account.    The  financial  institution  may  pay  any  sum  
in  the  account  to  a  party  at  any  time.    On  the  death  of  a  party,  the  party'ʹs  ownership  
of  the  account  passes  as  a  part  of  the  party'ʹs  estate  under  the  party'ʹs  will  or  by  
intestacy.  




Enter  the  name(s)  of  the  convenience  signer(s),  if  you  want  one  or  more  
convenience  signers  on  this  account:  
______________________________  
______________________________  
___  (4)    MULTIPLE-­‐‑PARTY  ACCOUNT  WITH  RIGHT  OF  
SURVIVORSHIP.    The  parties  to  the  account  own  the  account  in  proportion  to  the  
parties'ʹ  net  contributions  to  the  account.    The  financial  institution  may  pay  any  sum  
in  the  account  to  a  party  at  any  time.    On  the  death  of  a  party,  the  party'ʹs  ownership  
of  the  account  passes  to  the  surviving  parties.  
Enter  the  names  of  the  parties:  
______________________________  
______________________________  
Enter  the  name(s)  of  the  convenience  signer(s),  if  you  want  one  or  more  
convenience  signers  on  this  account:  
______________________________  
______________________________  
___  (5)    MULTIPLE-­‐‑PARTY  ACCOUNT  WITH  RIGHT  OF  
SURVIVORSHIP  AND  P.O.D.  (PAYABLE  ON  DEATH)  DESIGNATION.    The  
parties  to  the  account  own  the  account  in  proportion  to  the  parties'ʹ  net  
contributions  to  the  account.    The  financial  institution  may  pay  any  sum  in  the  
account  to  a  party  at  any  time.    On  the  death  of  the  last  surviving  party,  the  
ownership  of  the  account  passes  to  the  P.O.D.  beneficiaries.  
Enter  the  names  of  the  parties:  
______________________________  
______________________________  
Enter  the  name  or  names  of  the  P.O.D.  beneficiaries:  
______________________________  
______________________________  
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form  contains  a  notice  advising  the  depositor  that  the  selections  
on   the   form   may   determine   ownership   of   the   funds   at   death.    
This  addition  satisfies  the  cautionary  function,  to  some  extent,180  
and   provides   much   more   reliable   evidence   that   the   depositor  
 
Enter  the  name(s)  of  the  convenience  signer(s),  if  you  want  one  or  more  
convenience  signers  on  this  account:  
______________________________  
______________________________  
___  (6)    CONVENIENCE  ACCOUNT.    The  parties  to  the  account  own  
the  account.    One  or  more  convenience  signers  to  the  account  may  make  account  
transactions  for  a  party.    A  convenience  signer  does  not  own  the  account.    On  the  
death  of  the  last  surviving  party,  ownership  of  the  account  passes  as  a  part  of  the  
last  surviving  party'ʹs  estate  under  the  last  surviving  party'ʹs  will  or  by  intestacy.    
The  financial  institution  may  pay  funds  in  the  account  to  a  convenience  signer  
before  the  financial  institution  receives  notice  of  the  death  of  the  last  surviving  
party.    The  payment  to  a  convenience  signer  does  not  affect  the  parties'ʹ  ownership  
of  the  account.  
Enter  the  names  of  the  parties:  
______________________________  
______________________________  
Enter  the  name(s)  of  the  convenience  signer(s):  
______________________________  
______________________________  
___  (7)    TRUST  ACCOUNT.    The  parties  named  as  trustees  to  the  
account  own  the  account  in  proportion  to  the  parties'ʹ  net  contributions  to  the  
account.    A  trustee  may  withdraw  funds  from  the  account.    A  beneficiary  may  not  
withdraw  funds  from  the  account  before  all  trustees  are  deceased.    On  the  death  of  
the  last  surviving  trustee,  the  ownership  of  the  account  passes  to  the  beneficiary.    
The  trust  account  is  not  a  part  of  a  trustee'ʹs  estate  and  does  not  pass  under  the  
trustee'ʹs  will  or  by  intestacy,  unless  the  trustee  survives  all  of  the  beneficiaries  and  
all  other  trustees.  
Enter  the  name  or  names  of  the  trustees:  
______________________________  
______________________________  
Enter  the  name  or  names  of  the  beneficiaries:  
______________________________  
______________________________  
Enter  the  name(s)  of  the  convenience  signer(s),  if  you  want  one  or  more  
convenience  signers  on  this  account:  
______________________________  
______________________________  
   180.     A  more  conspicuous  notice  would  ensure  that  a  depositor  is  on  notice  that  
he  may  be  about  to  determine  how  the  funds  will  pass  at  death.    See,  e.g.,  U.C.C.  §  1-­‐‑
201(10)  (2011)  (suggesting  all  capital  letters,  larger  type,  or  contrasting  color  to  meet  
a  requirement  that  a  term  or  clause  is  conspicuous).      
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intended   the   form   as   a   will   substitute,   if   the   depositor   in   fact  
chooses   survivorship   or   pay-­‐‑on-­‐‑death   options.     Next,   the   form  
defines  each  type  of  account.    For  each  account  where  more  than  
one   party   may   withdraw   funds,   the   form   describes   the  
ownership  rights  of  the  parties  or  cosigner  and  the  rights  of  the  
financial  institution.    And  finally,  the  form  gives  the  option  of  a  
“convenience   account.”      Both   the   name  of   the   account   and   the  
corresponding   explanation   make   it   clear   to   our   hypothetical  
depositor   that   this   is   the  correct  choice.     Furthermore,   the   form  
also   allows   for   combinations   of   pay-­‐‑on-­‐‑death,   agency,   and  
multiple   parties.      The   survey   participants   were   much   more  
successful   at   completing   the   Texas   form.      Thirteen   correctly  
chose  convenience  account  provisions.  
Other  states  have  either  forms  or  statutory  requirements  for  
bank   deposit   agreements.      For   example,   as   mentioned   earlier,  
North   Carolina   statutes   require   a   depositor   to   indicate   in  
conspicuous   language   an   intent   that   the   account   belong   to   the  
survivor.181      Michigan   statute   suggests   a   form   where   for   each  
“person”   listed,   lines  are   checked   indicating   that  person’s   right  
to  withdraw   and   the   disposition   of   the   funds   in   the   account   if  
that   person   dies   before   the   other   person.182      A   Virginia   statute  
requires   that   a   bank   use   either   two   separate   forms   for   joint  
accounts   with   or   without   survivorship   rights,   or   one   form  
clearly   indicating   the   two   choices   and   requiring   that   the  
depositor   sign   one   or   the   other.183      The   Virginia   statute   also  
requires   disclosures   explaining   that   the   funds   will   pass   to   the  
survivor  or  to  the  estate,  depending  on  the  type  of  account.184  
The   goal   of   any   form   should   be   to   allow   the   depositor   to  
express  his  intent  and  thereby  provide  evidence  of  that  intent  at  
the   depositor’s   death.      To   meet   those   goals,   the   form   should  
have   as   few   choices   as   possible   and   explain   those   choices   in  
 
   181.     N.C.  GEN.   STAT.   §   53C-­‐‑6-­‐‑6   to   53C-­‐‑6-­‐‑7   (2012)   (for   survivorship   rights   and  
POD  designations);  N.C.  GEN.  STAT.  §  54C-­‐‑167  (for  agency  designations).      
   182.     MICH.  COMP.  LAWS  §  487.715  (2005).      
   183.     VA.  CODE  ANN.  §  6.2-­‐‑618(A)  (1950).      
   184.     VA.  CODE  ANN.  §  6.2-­‐‑618  (1950).  
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plain  English,   rather   than   in   legal   terminology.     A   form  should  
also   adequately   caution   the   testator   by   explicitly   advising   him  
that  all  parties  concerned  will  rely  on  the  form  to  determine  who  
owns   the   funds   after   the   depositor’s   death.      A   good  
standardized   form   satisfies   the   channeling   function   of  
formalities,  allowing  the  depositor  and  the  courts  to  rely  on  the  
document   as   certain   indication  of  donative   intent.  A   suggested  
form:  
ACCOUNT  FORM  
OWNER(S)   OF   ACCOUNT:  
_______________________________  
________________________________  
(Persons   listed   as   owners   actually   own   the   funds   in   the  
account   in   proportion   to   their   net   contributions.   “Net  
contributions”   means   deposits   made   by   the   owner   less   the  
amount   of   withdrawals   by   that   owner   or   for   that   owner’s  
benefit.   Be   aware   that   the   bank   is   not   responsible   for  
determining   proportionate   ownership   and   may   pay   funds   to  
anyone  listed  as  an  owner.)  
OTHER   AUTHORIZED   SIGNERS:  
__________________________  ___________________________  
__________________________  ___________________________  
(“Other  authorized  signers”  do  not  own  the  funds  but  may  
write   checks   or   withdraw   funds   for   the   convenience   of   the  
owners  or  at  their  instruction.  Authorized  signers  have  no  right  
to  the  funds  for  their  personal  use.  Their  ability  to  write  checks  
or  withdraw  funds  terminates  at  the  death  of  the  last  owner.  Be  
aware   that   the   bank   may   pay   funds   to   any   authorized   signer  
until  notified  of  the  death  of  the  owners.)  
RIGHTS   AT   DEATH:   THE   SELECTIONS   YOU   MAKE  
HERE  WILL   DETERMINE  WHO   RECEIVES   THE   FUNDS   AT  
YOUR   DEATH.   UNLESS   YOU   INDICATE   OTHERWISE,  
THESE   SELECTIONS   WILL   GOVERN   INSTEAD   OF   YOUR  
WILL.  
1.  Answer  question  1  only  if  more  than  one  owner  is  listed  
above.  
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A.  At  death  of  an  owner,  do  the  owner’s  funds  pass  to  other  
living  owners?      YES  ____    NO  _____  
If  there  is  more  than  one  owner,  and  you  check  “NO”,  each  
owner’s  share  of  funds  will  pass  to  the  owner’s  estate  according  
to   the   owner’s   will   or   state   law   if   the   owner   has   no   will.   Be  
aware   that   the   bank   is   not   responsible   for   determining  
percentages   of   ownership   and  may  pay   funds   to   the   surviving  
owner.  
B.   If   you   answered   YES   in   1A   above,   choose   one   of   the  
following  options:  
_____   At   death   of   last   owner,   funds   pass   to   that   owner’s  
estate  according  to  that  owner’s  will  or  state  law.  
_____  At   death   of   last   owner,   funds   pass   to   the   following  
persons:  
_______________    _______________    _______________  
2.   If   there   is  only  one  owner  of   the  account,   choose  one  of  
the  following  options:  
___   At   death   of   owner,   funds   pass   to   owner’s   estate  
according  to  will  or  the  state  laws  for  persons  without  wills.  
____At  death  of  owner,  funds  pass  to  the  following  persons:  
_____________________      _______________________    
______________________  
CONCLUSION  
Return   to   the  hypothetical  widow  or  widower  who,  because  of  
concerns   about   health,   added   one   of   three   children   as   an  
additional   signer.      Perhaps   he   or   she   was   offered   only   a   joint  
account   form,   or   perhaps   didn’t   understand   all   the   choices   on  
the   form   the  bank  provided,   so  he  or   she  added  one  child  as  a  
party  and  created  survivorship  rights  (either  by  using  the  word  
survivor  or   just  by  having  an  additional  person  on   the  account  
in  those  states  that  consider  any  multi-­‐‑party  account  to  belong  to  
the   survivor).      Perhaps   the   elderly  person  was   even   concerned  
enough  about  making  things  go  smoothly  for  the  three  children  
that  he  or  she  executed  a  will,  leaving  everything  to  the  three  of  
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them  equally,  which  is  how  the  person  intended  all  of  the  estate,  
including   the   bank   account,   to   be   divided.      Does   the   will  
override  the  designation  on  the  bank  account?     Certainly  not  in  
the  modern  Uniform  Probate  Code  jurisdictions  if  the  bank  used  
the   statutory   form.      The   form   is   conclusive,   and   if   he   or   she  
didn’t  understand  the  need  for  an  “agency”  account  (as  most  of  
the   survey   participants   didn’t),   the   account   goes   to   the   child  
whose  name  is  on  the  account.185     Certainly  not  in  a  conclusive-­‐‑
presumption  state  where  the  word  “survivor”  or  “survivorship”  
means   that   the   court   closes   its   eyes   to   any   contrary   evidence.    
Only   in   states   where   the   children   are   allowed   to   present  
evidence  to  overcome  the  presumption  is   there  any  chance  that  
his  wishes  will  be   carried  out,   and  even   then,   the   children  will  
likely   have   to   prove   intent   by   clear   and   convincing   evidence,  
which  will  be  difficult.  
The  majority   of   courts   and   legislatures   have   created   rules  
that   favor   co-­‐‑tenants   of   bank   accounts   over   the   heirs   or  
beneficiaries   of   the   decedent.      The   policy   of   encouraging   the  
avoidance   of   probate   has   outweighed   the   lack   of   policy  
justification   for   treating   joint   accounts   as   wills   substitutes.    
Furthermore,  the  recognition  that  joint  bank  accounts  are  unique  
has  given  way   to   a  desire   for   certainty  of   result.      Instead,   joint  
bank   accounts   have   been   swept   along   with   the   rest   of   the  
“Nonprobate  Revolution.”  
A   state   wishing   to   both   end   disputes   over   joint   bank  
accounts   and   ensure   that   the   depositor’s   intent   is   respected  
should   do   one   of   two   things.      First,   and   ideally,   the   state  
legislature   should  mandate   a   bank   account   form   that   allows   a  
depositor  to  clearly  indicate  ownership  at  the  depositor’s  death.    
The   form   most   commonly   adopted   by   legislatures   thus   far   is  
confusing   and,   without   reliable   assistance   from   a   bank  
employee,  seems  unlikely  to  result  in  a  clear  expression  of  intent.    
Legislatures   should   provide   an   easy   way   for   depositors   to  
confidently   express   their   intent.      Second,   courts   deciding  
 
   185.     UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  §  6-­‐‑213(b)  (amended  2008).  
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disputes   where   the   legislature   has   not   required   a   specific  
account   form—or   where   the   form   was   not   used—   should  
recognize   the   distinct   possibility   that   the   decedent   intended   a  
convenience  account   instead  of  a  survivorship  account.     Courts  
should   require   proof   that   the   bank   actually   offered   an  
understandable   account   agreement   that  would   have   allowed   a  
convenience  account.     Absent   such  evidence,   courts   should  not  
treat   joint   bank   accounts   as   will   substitutes.      Nor   should   they  
engage   in  presumptions,  whether  conclusive  or   rebuttable,   that  
the  word  “survivorship”  or   its  absence   indicates   the  decedent’s  
intent,  or  worse,  presumptions  that  merely  listing  an  additional  
authorized   signer   indicates   intent   for   survivorship   rights.    
Courts  should  remember  that  as  in  wills,  the  ultimate  goal  is  to  
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